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In December 1963, William K. Kerr, then Associate General
Solicitor of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,
authored an article in the St. John's Law Review entitled Condo-
minium- Statutory Implementation.' This article was based in part
on Mr. Kerr's paper, "Condominium, A Preview," delivered in May of
1962 before the Association of Life Insurance Counsel, and discussed
the condominium concept, some legal problems then apparent, and
some of the solutions to the legal problems afforded by then existing
legislation.2
At the time Mr. Kerr wrote his paper and article, many questioned
whether condominiums were an appropriate form of real estate invest-
ment for institutional lenders, and why institutions should be inter-
ested in the development of condominium laws. In the eleven years that
have followed, we have seen the "spectacular sweep of condominium
legislation across the land,"3 and the growth of public acceptance of
the condominium form as evidenced by the recent -tremendous surge in
condominium development.4 At the same time, a virtual revolution was
t This article is based upon a paper presented by the author to the Association of
Life Insurance Counsel on May 8, 1973. 23 Ass'N oF LIFE INs. COUNSEL PROC. 205 (1973).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his associates: Carl D. Simoni of
the New York Bar and Richard G. Clarke, a member of the Fordham Law Review, in
connection with the 1973 paper; and Vincent Alexander and Irene Castaldo of the St.
John's Law Review, in connection with this revision.
*Associate General Counsel, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Law, Fordham University J.D., Harvard Law School, 1960; LL.M., New York
University, 1965.
I Kerr, Condominium -Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1963).
2 Kerr, 16 Ass'N OF LIFE INS. COUNSEL PROC. 231 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kerr
Paper]. The paper was read before the Association of Life Insurance Counsel on Tuesday,
May 29, 1962, at The Greenbrier, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Mr. Kerr was
then Associate Counsel for The Equitable Life Assurance Society.
3 Browder, Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium Units (The Right of First
Refusal), 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 231 [hereinafter cited as Browder].
4 For example, the Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1973, at 1, col. 5, reported that
"[a]cording to National Association of Home Builders' surveys, condominiums accounted
for 11% of 'for-sale built homes' in 1970, close to 30% last year and may approach 50%
this year. Advance Mortgage Corp. says condos are 70% of apartment starts in the
Miami area, 60% in Washington and San Diego, and more than half in Detroit. One
real estate research man says they could be 'up to 50% of the multi-family market in
Chicago, compared to no more than 5% five years ago. . . .' The condominium trend
is 'going to remain forever,' says Michael Sumichrast, chief economist of the NAHB.
'It is just surprising it didn't start a long time ago."' Even discounting the natural
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taking place in real estate financing practice and philosophy of institu-
tional investors,5 putting life insurance companies and other institu-
tions in the forefront of development of innovative approaches to real
estate investment. 6
Over a decade ago the only area of investment in condominiums
contemplated as a practical possibility by most institutions was mort-
gage investments on individual condominium unitsJ Now, with the
growing popularity of condominiums together with the change in
approach of institutional investors, institutional involvement in con-
dominiums is beginning to encompass not only mortgage investments,
where the major emphasis still remains, but also sponsorship of con-
dominium developments, and in some circumstances ownership of
condominium units in commercial developments.
This article, which is also based upon a paper presented to the
Association of Life Insurance Counsel,8 will view again the condo-
minium picture from the standpoint of some of the current problems
faced by, and some of the opportunities available to institutional
investors as condominium mortgage lenders, as condominium sponsors
and, to some degree, as condominium owners. In this connection, the
life insurance company will often be considered typical of the institu-
tional investor. While statutes governing other institutional investors
enthusiasm of the quoted spokesmen, there is no doubt that condominiums have de-
veloped remarkably in the past few years, and this development appears to be con-
tinuing. In the Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1974, at I, col. 6 the condominium was
described as "the hottest product in residential real estate for the last three years ...
In Chicago last year, about 13,700 individual condominium units were registered, more
than in all the previous five years .. " The article states that more condominiums were
expected to be built in 1974 than in any previous year and reports that "some experts
estimate that there are more than two million condominium units in the country as
compared to only 300,000 in 1970." The 1974 article, however, was directed at condo-
minium abuses and noted some dark clouds on the horizon including substantial inven-
tories of unsold condominiums in Chicago, San Diego, Miami and Seattle, a recent move
away from condominiums and toward rental units in Detroit (a reversal of the trend
reported a year earlier) and purchaser inducements being offered, in Atlanta, San Diego
and Palm Beach.
5 For a discussion of this development, see Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate
Equity Investments and the Institutional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39
FORDHAM L. Rav. 579-89 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Roegge, Talbot & Zinman].
6 This is discussed in connection with mortgage lending in A. AXELROD, C. BERGER:
Q. JOHNsrONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 98 (1971), where the authors state: "[Miuch
of the innovation that gives real estate financing a complexity and sophistication un-
dreamed of twenty years ago has appeared in transactions involving insurance company
loans."
7The Kerr Paper seemed to assume this, and a substantial portion was devoted to
an analysis of "whether the mortgage on a condominium apartment is a legal investment
for life insurance companies. . . ." Kerr Paper, supra note 2, at 283.
8Zinman, Condominium-A Re-view, 23 Ass'N OF LIFE INS. COUNSEL PROC. 205
(1973).
THE INSTITUTIONAL LENDER
may vary from those affecting the life insurer, the problems con-
fronted by all institutions are somewhat similar.
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AS A CONDOMINIUM MORTGAGEE
When institutions first considered condominiums, many were con-
cerned as to whether an investment in a condominium mortgage
would be an authorized investment within the meaning of statutes
regulating institutional investments. The fear was that ownership of a
condominium unit together with an undivided interest in common
areas might not be considered real estate. If such fears were well-
founded, an investment in a condominium mortgage might not be an
investment in a mortgage of real estate, and thus might be in violation
of applicable regulatory statutes. The Kerr Paper did not feel that this
was a significant problem 9 and events since this paper bear out the
accuracy of its conclusions. Today, air space is generally recognized as
real property,10 and most condominium statutes make this clear.", The
New York provision, which is similar to the FHA Model Act,' 2 and
typical of many other statutes, reads: "Each unit, together with its
common interest, shall for all purposes constitute real property."'' 3
In addition to the foregoing, while it was generally felt that invest-
ment regulatory provisions requiring mortgages be a "first lien"' 4 on
9 Kerr Paper, supra note 2, at 283.
10 See, e.g., Liebman, Development of Air Rights, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 13, 14 & 15, 1968
(printed in four instalments), at 1; Report, Recent Developments in Airspace Utilization,
5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 347 (1970); Report, Final Draft of Model Airspace Act, 7
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 353 (1972). Section 3 of the Model Airspace Act, written under
the auspices of the American Bar Association, and its Section on Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law, states: "Airspace as defined herein is real property, and until title thereto
or rights, interests or estates therein are separately transferred, airspace is the property
of the person or persons holding title to the land surface beneath it." Model Airspace Act,
in 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 504 (1973). Somewhat before the drafting of the Model
Airspace Act, Lord Coke had said: "ihe earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not
only of water, as hath been said, but of ayre and all other things even up to heaven; for
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum . 1..." I E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITrTE-
TON 4a (1670). The Latin translates as, "To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to
the sky .. " BrAcn's LAw DICTIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1968).
11 "Basically, the statutes speak in terms of 'fee simple,' 'real property for all pur-
poses,' and the right to 'exclusive ownership and possession."' 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN,
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRAcTICE § 1.01[2], at 1-7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN &
RESKIN].
12 In 1962 the FHA prepared and distributed a "Model Statute for Creation of
Apartment Ownership" in order to facilitate the adoption of appropriate enabling legis-
lation in the various states. U.S. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MODEL STATUTE FOR CREATION OF APARTMENT OWNER-
sHIP, Font No. 3285 (1962) [hereinafter cited as FHA Model Act]. See Kerr, supra note 1,
at 13.
13 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-g (McKinney 1968).
14 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 81(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972), as amended, N.Y. Sass.
LAws [1973], ch. 1020 (McKinney).
1974]
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realty would cause no problem, there was some concern with the
validity of condominium mortgages under statutes requiring that the
land be "unencumbered."' 5 Would the condominium declaration and
bylaws to which the condominium is subject be encumbrances? The
Kerr Paper concluded that they were no more than restrictive cove-
nants which case law generally, and some state statutes specifically, held
not to be encumbrances.' 6 The New York Condominium Statute, per-
haps because of Kerr's concern, deals directly with the problem by
providing that investments in condominium- mortgages shall be con-
sidered legal investments for insurance companies and other institu-
tional investors. 17 This, however, appears to be an example of
"overkill," and may actually restrict institutional investments in con-
dominiums under so-called "basket" or "leeway" provisions.' 8 Of
course, where there is any doubt as to the legal right of an institution
to make condominium mortgage investments, it may be necessary to
urge that either the condominium statute or the laws regulating the
institution be amended to make it clear that such investments are
permitted.
Once it has been determined that the condominium mortgage
investment is a legal one for the institution, the next question is
whether the institution should or would be willing to make such
investments. The remainder of this part of the article will concentrate
on some of the current problem areas which make such an investment
more difficult than ordinary mortgage financing.
Common Expenses
In a condominium, each unit owner is liable for a proportionate
share of the common expenses. If the unit owner fails to pay these
charges, the association normally has a lien under the enabling statutes
on the unit, superior to other liens, with certain exceptions.' 9 Such
statutes generally protect the legality of the institutional mortgage by
15 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 63.7 (1970).
16 Kerr Paper, supra note 2, at 283-84.
17 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-f (McKinney 1968).
18 The language provides that insurance companies and certain other institutional
investors may not invest in mortgages "which are other than first mortgages . . . not-
withstanding any other provisions of law .. " N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw 339-ff(b) (McKinney
1968). An example of a New York "basket" or "leeway" provision is found in N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 81(17) (McKinney Supp. 1972), as amended, N.Y. SEss. LAWS [1973], ch. 1020 (McKinney).
19 These exceptions generally include, inter alia, first mortgages and deeds of trust,
and tax liens. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney Supp. 1973). California pro-
vides that such lien "shall be prior to all other liens recorded subsequent to the recorda-
tion of said notice of assessment except that the declaration of restrictions may provide
for the subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances." CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1356 (West Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 48:749
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making the lien for common charges subordinate to at least first mort-
gages of record.2 0 A notable exception is the Illinois statute which pro-
vides that if the board of managers properly sends successive notices of
the unit owner's successive defaults to the mortgagee, the mortgage will
(unless otherwise provided in the declaration or bylaws) be subject to
the lien for common expenses becoming due and payable within ninety
days after the mailing of each such notice. 21 Nevertheless, cautious
institutions may still have some question as to whether this statute
passes muster under applicable laws regulating mortgage investments. 22
Notwithstanding the protection afforded to mortgagees as against
the lien for common expenses, commentators have questioned whether
in some states the accrued common expenses allocable to a foreclosed
unit may be charged to the foreclosing mortgagee or other purchaser
at the foreclosure sale.23 It would seem that in any state where the
mortgage is superior to the lien for common expenses, foreclosure of
the mortgage should cut off the common expense lien. To permit the
association, after foreclosure, to reassess the past due expenses and
create a new lien therefor against the new owner would simply not
make sense. In any case, there should be no problem where the state
has adopted the FHA Model Act provision to the effect that the ac-
quiring mortgagee, his successors and assigns shall not be liable for the
prior unpaid common expenses and that such unpaid charges will
become common expenses collectible from all the owners including the
mortgagee.2 4
20 Some statutes, such as Florida's, go further, and provide that the lien "shall be
subordinate to the lien of a mortgage or other lien recorded prior to the time of re-
cording of the claim of lien." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.15(4) (1969).
21 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 § 309 (Smith-Hurd 1969). Other statutes may impose con-
ditions on the priority of the mortgage. For example, Missouri requires that the mortgage
contain an address of the mortgagee in Missouri for mailing of notices. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 448.080(2) (Supp. 1974). Obviously the language of each applicable statute must be
studied carefully.
22 See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 81(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972) which provides, inter alia,
"Nothing herein shall prohibit any investment by reason of the existence of any prior
lien for ground rents, taxes, assessments or other similar charges not yet delinquent."
Thomas H. Fegan, Associate General Counsel, Equitable Life Assurance Society, and a
member of the committee that drafted the Illinois statute, has stated with respect to
the Illinois provision that "it was a situation that could be corrected easily by the pay-
ment of money, could be made a default under the mortgage, and the amount spent
could be added to the debt and, therefore, was not of sufficient importance to prevent
the making of loans." Fegan, Financing Condominiums, in PRACTlcING LAW INSTITUTE,
COOPFAmTIVFS AND CONDOMINIUMS 246, 268 (J. McCord ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Fegan]. He noted, however, that he "would prefer not to have to contend with it and
will make every effort to have it waived if we are involved in a project early enough to
influence the drafting of the Declaration and Bylaws, provided we feel that it will not
adversely affect the sales program." Id.
23 See I ROHAN & RESKIN § 6.04[3].
24 FHA Model Act, supra note 12, at § 23(b). Each statute must be studied carefully
1974]
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Even though the mortgagee is generally protected against liens for
common expenses prior to foreclosure, the mortgagee as a unit owner
will become subject to payment of the unit's proportionate share of
future common expenses. As more and more unit owners default, the
share of common expenses of the remaining unit owners is likely to
increase. This is further exacerbated in New York where the statute
exempts municipal corporations acquiring a unit in tax enforcement
proceedings from liability for payment of common expenses applicable
to such unit during the period the municipal corporation holds title
to such unit, except to the extent of rent received by the municipal
corporation from the unit during such period.25 Thus, the mortgagee
on foreclosure may find that the common expenses allocable to the fore-
closed unit are far greater than they should be,26 especially where the
mortgagee is a "spot mortgagee" in that it does not hold all or a vast
majority of the mortgages on the condominium units.27 This problem
is compounded where the condominium is on leasehold property and
the common charges include ground rent,28 or if any part of the com-
mon property is covered by a blanket mortgage, 29 thus increasing
common charges for interest and principal payments.
Restrictions on Sale and Lease
If a condominium unit is mortgaged, that mortgage may some day
be foreclosed, and the institution holding that mortgage may find itself
in the position of a condominium unit owner. In this event, the mort-
gagee will wish to sell the property, and, until a sale is consummated,
lease it. However, many condominium documents restrict the ability
to insure that this freedom from liability for pre-foreclosure common expenses inures to
the benefit of transferees from the mortgagee. Also, the declaration and bylaws must
make it clear that unit owners (including the foreclosing mortgagee) are not liable for
common expenses arising after they have conveyed the property.
25 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-aa (McKinney 1968).
26 In this connection, the applicable statute should be checked to make certain that
the unit is protected against mechanics' liens for improvements to the common areas.
For example, New York provides that except for emergency repairs, labor performed or
materials furnished in connection with a unit shall not be the basis of a lien on any
unit unless the unit owner consented to the repairs. Labor performed or materials fur-
nished in connection with the common elements shall not be the basis for a lien on the
common elements, but the common charges are made trust funds for such payment. N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 339-1(2) (McKinney 1968). Several other statutes provide a pro rata
lien on each unit if the work was authorized by the condominium association. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1357 (West Supp. 1973).
27 Hereinafter, a mortgagee of a condominium unit who does not hold a substantial
portion of the unit mortgages in the condominium shall be referred to as a "spot
mortgagee."
28 See text accompanying notes 202-21 infra.
29 Id.
[Vol. 48:749
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to sell or lease. Such restrictions, if valid, would at best make more
difficult realization of the protection afforded by the mortgage, and at
worst, if the restrictions are too severe, could be violative of laws regu-
lating institutional investments.30
The restrictions found in condominium documents include out-
right prohibition unless approval is obtained from the association or
board of managers, a right of first refusal under which the association
or board may match bona fide offers, a right of first refusal or option at
fair market value or a fixed price, and a right to supply a purchaser to
meet the terms of a bona fide offer.31
The consensus appears to be that unless the condominium en-
abling statute permits such restraints, and many attempt to do so,32
these restraints, at least as far as they affect sales,3 3 would probably be in
technical violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities or prohibitions
against restraints on alienation. 34 But at the same time, the consensus
appears to oppose the technical application of these prohibitions to
condominiums, in favor of an approach which would permit reasonable
restraints in the interest of encouraging accepted social or economic
30 See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 78(2) (McKinney 1966) which reads in part as follows:
"The disposition of its property shall be at all times within the control of its board of
directors, in accordance with its charter and by-laws." While it could be argued that a
prohibition of sale without consent of the association might take the asset out of the
control of the directors, it could also be argued that the asset is the mortgage and at
least until default, may be disposed of by the insurance company.
31 See I RoHAN & RasKIN § 13.03[5], at 13-24; Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a
Statutory Foundation, 63 CoLust. L. REv. 986, 1017 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Berger];
Browder, supra note 3, at 237-43.
32 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-36-28 (1970), which states: "The rule of prop-
erty known as the rule against perpetuities and the rule of property known as the rule
restricting unreasonable restraints on alienation shall not be applied to defeat any of the
provisions of this chapter, or of any declaration, by-laws or other document executed in
accordance with this chapter." See also N.Y. RE&L PROP. LAw § 339-v(2)(a) (McKinney
1968) which states that the bylaws may contain
[p]rovisions governing the alienation, conveyance, sale, leasing, purchase, owner-
ship and occupancy of units provided, however, that the by-laws shall contain
no provision restricting the alienation, conveyance, sale, leasing, purchase, owner-
ship and occupancy of units because of race, creed, color or national origin.
Unlike the Rhode Island statute, the New York version does not specifically rule out
application of the perpetuities or alienation restraint doctrines to condominiums and
might be interpreted, however incorrectly, to permit only otherwise lawful restraints.
But see PRAcrICING LAw INsTITUTE, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 385-86 (J. McCord
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as PLI TRANSCRIu'r].
33 Restrictions on the ability to lease are often upheld where restrictions on the
ability to sell would fail. But see Berger, supra note 31, at 1019.
34See 1 RoHAN & REsKIN 10.03[l], at 10-16, 17, where the authors state, "If the
whole body of law pertaining to restraints on the alienation of a fee is applied to the
question of the legality of a restraint on alienation by a condominium right of first re-
fusal, the restraint will probably be held invalid." But see Moller, The Condominium
Confronts The Rule Against Perpetuities, 10 N.Y.L.F. 377 (1964) who argues forcefully
that these rules should not apply to the right of first refusal.
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ends.35 A leading case involving a cooperative housing association 3 6 ex-
pounded this view in upholding a right of first refusal, in language, at
least, which would seem applicable to condominiums.37 Fortunately for
the lender, the harsher the restraint the more chance that it will be
declared invalid. Nevertheless, whatever the chance that the restraint
is invalid, an institution may not want to take the chance that it will be
upheld.
In many cases restrictions on sale or lease are no problem since
the declaration or bylaws imposing such restraints make exception for
a foreclosing first mortgagee, permitting such mortgagee to sell or lease
the premises without restriction. 38 While such exceptions on behalf of
the first mortgagee may diminish the protection desired by purchasers of
condominium units, without such an exception institutions must accept
a degree of risk not generally required to be assumed in the ordinary
home mortgage situation.
Tort Liability and Corporate Ownership of Common Areas
A condominium purchaser is not only owner of his own unit, but
also normally an owner, as tenant in common, of the common areas. As
such, it would seem that the condominium owner would be subject to
joint and several liability arising out of the tort claims against the con-
dominium association in connection with the common areas. 39 The
35 See Browder, supra note 3, at 255-59. Of course, discrimination on the basis of
race, creed, color, sex, national origin, or age, would not be permitted, since it would
violate applicable laws against discrimination.
36 Gale v. York Center Community Co-op, Inc., 21 I1. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960).
It should be noted that restraints have generally been upheld with respect to cooperatives
(as distinguished from condominiums) on the ground that they do not involve fee interests
in real property to which rules against perpetuities and restraints on alienation arc
generally considered applicable. See Kerr Paper, supra note 2, at 280.
37 From the authorities here mentioned and many others examined, it woul
appear that the crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint
as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement.
If accepted social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is
reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be sustained.
21 IIl. 2d at 92, 171 N.E.2d at 33.
38 See, e.g., Declaration, Three Fountains (Salt Lake City, Utah 1964), § 22, reprinted
in IA ROHAN & REsKIN app. 169:
If the purchaser following such foreclosure sale (or grantee under deed given in
lieu of such foreclosure) shall be the then holder of the first mortgage, or its
nominee, the said holder or nominee may thereafter sell and convey the condo-
minium free and clear of the provisions of Paragraph 21 [right of first refusal],
but its grantee shall thereupon and thereafter be subject to all the provisions
thereof.
39 See Kerr Paper, supra note 2, at 277; Rohan, Perfecting the Condominium as a
Housing Tool: Innovations in Tort Liability and Insurance, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
305, 308 (1967); [hereinafter cited as Rohan]; Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Develop-
ment: Condominium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1104, 1143-45
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Schreiber].
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parade of possible exposure has been set forth in several articles4" and
runs the gamut from negligence of maintenance personnel and viola-
tion of fire and building codes to failure to maintain workmen's com-
pensation policies and products liability where food, beverages, or
detergents are dispensed through vending machines. To add to these
delightful prospects, a recent California case would indicate that negli-
gence liability might not be limited to outsiders, and that individual
unit owners might have a claim against the association for injuries
occurring in the common areas.41
Normally, when a mortgagee forecloses a mortgage and becomes
the owner of the mortgaged property, it obtains, or places the property
under its own liability insurance coverage. If the lender is a spot
mortgagee in a condominium, the liability coverage required might be
much greater than the amount of the mortgage would justify.42 When
the mortgagee holds mortgages on all or a major portion of the con-
dominium units,43 the problem may be substantially mitigated as will
be seen below. But where the institutional lender is a spot mortgagee, it
is essential that adequate insurance coverage be obtained by the con-
dominium association or that other forms of protection be secured.
Normally the declaration or the bylaws will make provision for
insurance. Often, however, the section dealing with the amount of
liability coverage merely states that it be "in such limits as the Board of
Managers may from time to time determine." 44 This, of course, is not
40 See, e.g., Knight, Incorporation of Condominium Common Areas? An Alternative,
50 N.C.L. REv. 1, 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Knight]; Lawrence, Tort Liability of a
Condominium Unit Owner, 2 REAL ESrATE L.J. 789 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lawrence];
Rohan, supra note 39, at 308-09.
41 In White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 831, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263 (Dist. Ct. App.
1971), the court held that a "condominium association may be sued for negligence in its
common name . ..by a member of the association . .. who may obtain a judgment
against the condominium and the condominium association." The court found that (a)
a condominium project and a condominium association are separate legal entities from
their unit owners and association members; and (b) a condominium owner normally has
no more control over operation of the common areas than he would have as a stock-
holder in a corporation. Id. at 829-30, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63. Thus, plaintiff could
not be barred from recovery under either the "joint enterprise" or "co-ownership" theories
generally employed to contest authority of condominium owners to maintain an action
against the association. This case is noted in 8 CALIF. W.L. REV. 536 (1972); 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 627 (1972); 25 VANn. L. REv. 271 (1972). In this connection see FED. R. Civ. 17(b).
42 In some cases it may be possible to place the unit under a blanket liability policy
held by an institutional mortgagee with no additional initial cost. However, in many
of these policies, recoveries are reflected in future premiums.
43 See text accompanying notes 104-30 infra.
44See Bylaws, St. Tropez Condominium, (New York, N.Y. 1965) reprinted in IA
ROHAN & REsKIN, app. C-l, at 101:
The Board of Managers shall also be required to obtain and maintain, to the
extent obtainable, public liability insurance in such limits as the Board of
Managers may from time to time determine, covering each member of the
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very reassuring to the mortgagee. Even where amounts and coverage
that the mortgagee considers adequate are specified in the bylaws, one
must consider what would happen if the bylaws are later amended, if
the condominium association does not have the funds to pay the
premium or otherwise fails to keep the policy in force, or if the condi-
tions of the policy are violated. Again, if the mortgagee holds the major
portion of the mortgages on the condominium, it can prevent modifica-
tions of the bylaws and require that insurance be kept in force through
properly drafted default provisions in the mortgages. If the mortgagee
does not hold many mortgages, threat of foreclosure will not necessarily
result in the obtaining of the proper insurance by the association, and
foreclosure will only put the mortgagee in title, subject to all the un-
insured liabilities.
In a few jurisdictions, a statutory solution has been sought for the
unit owner's tort liability. For example, some states provide that the
unit owners have no liability for torts committed by the condominium
association.45 Others provide that an owner's liability is limited to the
unit owner's proportionate share of the judgment. 46 These statutes
would seem to give the unit owners, and thus the foreclosing mortgagee,
the kind of protection that is necessary. If the condominium association
fails to carry adequate insurance, on foreclosure the mortgagee can
obtain, or put the property under, its own policy under circumstances
in which the insurance coverage would bear a reasonable relationship
to the amount of the investment.
While a statutory solution to this problem would seem to be the
most advisable, where such protection is not afforded other solutions
must be sought. It has been suggested that the common areas be held by
a corporation with the unit owners owning their unit in fee, and stock
Board of Managers, the managing agent, the manager, and each unit owner.
Such public liability coverage shall also cover cross liability claims of one insured
against another.
45 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.18(2) (1969), which provides:
The owner of a unit shall have no personal liability for any damages caused by
the association on or in connection with the use of the common elements. A
unit owner shall be liable for injuries or damages resulting from an accident
in his own unit to the same extent and degree that the owner of a house would
be liable for an accident occurring within his house.
46 See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 64.32.240 (1966), which provides in part:
Actions relating to the common areas and facilities for damages arising out of
tortious conduct shall be maintained only against the association of apartment
owners and any judgment lien or other charge resulting therefrom shall be
deemed a common expense, which judgment lien or other charge shall be removed
from any apartment and its percentage of undivided interest in the common
areas and facilities upon payment by the respective owner of his proportionate
share thereof based on the percentage of undivided interest oned by such
apartment owner.
See also ALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. § 34.07.260(b) (Supp. 1971).
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in the corporation, thus avoiding the unit owners' unlimited liability.47
However, while the courts normally respect the corporate entity, there
is always the danger that they will "pierce the corporate veil. ' 48 In the
condominium situation, the most obvious danger areas that might lead
a court to disregard the corporate entity would seem to arise from:
(a) the unit owners or the association not respecting the corporate
entity; or (b) the existence of easements or liens held by the unit
owners which might so reduce the value of the corporation's fee title
that it would be considered too severely undercapitalized.49 As to (a),
the spot mortgagee may have difficulty in controlling the action of the
unit owners and the association, and as to (b), there is good question
as to whether any mortgagee would want to have valuable common
areas owned outright by the corporation and subject to being sold to
satisfy a judgment lien.
In addition to the problems of the corporate entity, there are a
number of other problems arising from corporate ownership of the
common areas involving both condominium law and tax law. One
problem is whether the condominium enabling statutes require amend-
ment to permit corporations to own the common elements. Some of
the statutes specifically permit incorporation of the association,50 but
these provisions do not necessarily permit the incorporated association
to own the common elements.51 Most of the statutes in this connection
47 See Knight, supra note 40, at 7-9; Schreiber, supra note 39, at 1143-44; Note,
Condominiums: Incorporation of the Common Elements- A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. Rv.
321 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Incorporation of the Common Elements].
48 The general rule is that a corporation is an entity separate and apart from its
stockholders and that its stockholders are not personally liable for the debts of the cor-
poration. Under some circumstances, however, the courts have pierced the corporate
veil. These circumstances generally involve situations where the corporation is under-
capitalized, the corporate entity is disregarded by the principals, or the corporation is
held to be a "mere instrumentality" of the parent. Compare Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d
497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941), with Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc.,
309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955). See generally H. BALLANTINE, CoR'oRAroNs §§ 118-142
(rev. ed. 1946).
49 This may become a greater problem in connection with the alternative proposal
discussed in the text at note 63 infra.
50 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-12 (Supp. 1973) which provides in part: "The
association may be any entity recognized by the laws of New Jersey, including but not
limited to a business corporation or a nonprofit corporation." See Anderson, Tax Aspects
of Cooperative and Condominium Housing, N.Y.U. 25TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 79, 89-98
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Tax Aspects].
01 A recent decision in California contains dictum to the effect that a corporation
cannot "properly" hold title to the common elements. See Friendly Village Community
Ass'n, Inc. v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 225 n.3, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126
n.3 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973) where a condominium association, incorporated only for the
purpose of providing management services, sued the builders of the condominium for
negligent construction. The court denied the corporation's standing to sue, holding that
the unit owners were the real parties in interest, that is, the parties having an ownership
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are gems of ambiguity. The New York statute is typically confusing.
As can best be determined, it would seem that each owner must own in
fee simple absolute only his unit 52 and that such unit must exit on a
public street or common element leading to such a public street.53 Each
unit must have a common interest, i.e., a proportionate interest in the
common elements appurtenant to it,54 and such common interest must
have a permanent character and may not be altered without the consent
of all unit owners affected.55 The common elements may include what-
ever the declaration says they include, 0 but apparently must include an
entry to a public street by virtue of the definition of unit.
Since the New York statute does not say that the common elements
must be owned in fee simple absolute and defines unit owner only as
a person owning "a unit" in fee simple absolute, it is possible to argue
that the common elements can be owned by a corporation with the
unit owner holding an easement or the stock of the corporation. 7 A
or possessory interest. In a footnote, the court examined the definitions of "condominium,"
"unit," and "common areas" provided in the California statute and concluded:
Because of the nature of a condominium, the complaint could not properly
have alleged ownership in plaintiff [management corporation]. . ... [lhe owners
of a condominium are the grantees of the units, each grantee owning a separate
interest in his unit and an interest, as tenant in common, in the common areas.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court seemed to rely primarily on a section of the
California condominium statute which states that "[t]he common areas are owned by
the owners of the units as tenants in common, in equal shares, one for each unit." CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1353(b) (West Supp. 1974). Since § 1350(4) defines "common areas" to mean
"the entire project excepting all units," the extent of individual liability arising from
joint ownership in California would presumably be dependent on the extent of the
common areas included in the project. Thus, if limited liability via the incorporation
route is desired in California, it might still be possible to adopt the approaches discussed
for New York, in the text at note 57 infra.
52The definition of "unit" says that it means "a part of the property intended for
any type of use or uses...." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(13) (McKinney 1968). The
FHA Model Act, from which this may have been derived, uses the word "apartment"
in lieu of "unit" and provides that "apartment" means "a part of the property intended
for any type of independent use .. " FHA Model Act, § 2(a) (emphasis added). This
seems to make a little more sense. Under the New York version, the common swimming
pool seems to fit within the definition of "unit."
53 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-3(13) (McKinney 1968).
541d. § 339-i(l).
55 Id. § 339-i(2). One writer has suggested that a provision such as this would have
to be amended to permit ownership of the common elements by a corporation. Incor-
poration of the Common Elements, supra note 47, at 331. It should be noted, however
that this would only seem a problem when the common interest is first owned by the
unit owners and thereafter an attempt is made to convey the fee title to the common
interest to a corporation. If the condominium is initially formed with the unit owners
having fee title to their unit and an easement from, or stock ownership in the corpo-
ration owning the common areas, assuming this is permitted by the statute, there will
be no need to separate the common interest from the unit.
56 The definition of "common elements" (N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(3) (McKinney
1968)) applies "unless otherwise provided in the declaration." Id.
57 The definition of "property," a term which is used in the statute in connection
with, inter alia, administration and distribution of profits, reads as follows: "'Property'
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slightly more cautious argument in New York might be that it would be
possible to keep the title to the common elements in the unit owner,
but limit the common elements to that needed to give entry to a public
street and put title to the recreational facilities and the like in a cor-
poration, thus somewhat limiting, but not eliminating, the tort risk.
Another problem pointed out by one writer58 is that if the unit
owner does not own an interest in the common areas, the value of his
real property for mortgage purposes would be limited under most
investment statutes to the value of the unit itself, thus resulting in a
smaller legal loan limit. But perhaps the greatest problem would be
in the area of taxation. A stockholder cannot normally deduct real
estate taxes imposed upon the corporation in which he owns stock
since the deduction applies to the person on whom the taxes are im-
posed.50 It is for this reason that the Internal Revenue Code specifically
provides that shares in a cooperative may be treated as real property for
tax purposes. 60 Thus, it would appear that special legislation on the
federal level would be required before the corporate ownership pro-
posal could be a practical solution. Until such legislation is obtained,
there would be a serious tax disadvantage to corporate ownership of the
common areas, although an appropriate part of the real estate taxes for
the common areas might be used by the corporation to offset income
means and includes the land, the building and all other improvements thereon, owned
in fee simple absolute, and all easements, rights and appurtenances belonging thereto,
and all other property, personal or mixed, intended for use in connection therewith,
which have been or are intended to be submitted to the provisions of this article." N.Y.
RF t. PROP. LAiW § 339-e(11) (McKinney 1968) (emphasis added). The emphasized "owned
in fee simple absolute" unfortunately does not indicate by whom. Thus, it could be
argued that since the corporate association would own the common elements in fee
simple absolute the common elements would be "property." However, since most real
property is owned by someone in fee simple absolute, this interpretation would render
the statutory clause meaningless. Notwithstanding the foregoing, easements from, or
stock of, the corporate owner would seem to fit within the emphasized "easements,
rights and appurtenances ... intended to be submitted to the provision of this article."
For a recent amendment including leaseholds in the definition of "property" for nonresi-
dential condominiums, see note 214 infra.
58 Knight, supra note 40, at 9-10.
59 See generally J. MERTENS, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 27.02 (J. Malone
rev. ed. 1969).
60 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 216. See also id. § 1034(f). It does not appear that a
corporation owning the common areas of a condominium could be considered as a
"cooperative housing corporation" within the § 216(b)(1) definition which requires, inter
alia, that each stockholder be entitled "solely by reason of his ownership of stock in the
corporation" to occupy his unit. Nevertheless, it does seem incongruous to give cooperative
stockholders the tax advantages of individual ownership of real estate, while denying
such tax advantages to individual condominium owners of real estate who have put
common areas in a corporation to obtain the type of liability protection available to
cooperative stockholders. In light of this, a clarification of the Internal Revenue Code
might be a feasible solution.
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from commercial facilities in such areas.61 If there is such income, and
it exceeds the deductions therefor, there may also be a problem of
double taxation, as income would be taxable to the corporation at the
corporate rate and then taxable to the unit owners as dividends. Double
taxation, as one writer has pointed out, could, at least under some
circumstances, be disastrous.6 2
There is, however, at least one variation of the corporate owner-
ship proposal which would eliminate or subtantially reduce some of the
problems discussed. It has been proposed 63 that the unit owners con-
tinue to own the common areas but lease these interests to a corporation
to run them. Thus, it was argued, it would be unnecessary to decide
whether a corporation could hold title to the common areas; the com-
mon areas can be valued for mortgage purposes; real estate taxes can be
deducted by the unit owners, who would remain obligated to pay them;
and the unit owners could in most cases avoid liability for other than
their own acts in the common areas,0 4 although it is possible that in
some circumstances this liability may survive. 65 Where the common
areas include commercial facilities whose income is greater than the ap-
plicable deductions, one writer has suggested that it might be possible
to have rent payable or attributable from the corporation to the unit
owners, thus avoiding, or at least minimizing, double taxation.66 This
may run into serious objections from the IRS and was apparently writ-
ten prior to the adoption of section 277 of the Internal Revenue Act
61 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 277, and note 66 infra for limits on the extent of
the corporation's tax deductions.
62 Anderson, Some Tax Aspects of the Condominium, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 220, 229 [here-
inafter cited as Anderson].
63 Knight, supra note 40, at 11.
64The duty of care to make or keep premises safe-where it exists at all-
generally rests upon the person who has occupancy or possession of the premises.
If premises are leased, the tenant is generally considered as entitled to exclusive
possession of them, and therefore alone liable to visitors for injuries caused by
their dangerous condition or use.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 27.16, at 1506 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
The facts in the condominium situation may somewhat cloud this rationale, since the
lessors will continue to use the leased premises.
65 See R STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 356-62 (1965).
66 Anderson, supra note 62, at 229-30; Tax Aspects, supra note 50, at 97-98. A similar
argument might be made in connection with the corporate ownership proposal, under
which the fees paid by the unit owners to the corporation owning the common areas
would be so set by contract that the expenses of the corporation in operating the common
areas would equal the payments by the unit owners plus the income from the commercial
facilities. But see note 67 infra and INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 277, and Proposed Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.277-1-3, 37 Fed. Reg. 9278 (1972), under which certain membership organizations
may take deductions attributable to furnishing services to members only to the extent
of income derived from members or transactions with members. The proposed regulation
will consider as income from members that portion of rent received from commercial
facilities equal to the percentage of the total income of the facility that came from
members. Id. § 1.277-1(d)(3).
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which restricts this possibility.67 In addition, the corporation holding a
leasehold which is producing little or no net income might be subject
to attack on its corporate entity on the ground of undercapitalization. 8
Thus, the corporate solution may create more problems than it
solves. The real solution, therefore, lies in the amendment of enabling
legislation limiting a unit owner's tort liability. Absent such legislation,
the condominium spot mortgagee may have to assume some greater
risks, or incur some greater expenses, than might normally be associated
with mortgage lending.0 9
Casualty Insurance
It has been said that the "attorney who seeks to draft a viable casu-
alty insurance program is confronted by a legal Gordian knot of com-
plex and often inconsistent rights and duties incident to the condomin-
ium." 0 From the mortgagee's point of view, it is essential that this knot
be untied. For the mortgagee must require adequate insurance for both
the common elements and the individual units.
The enabling statutes, if they have developed any consistent trend,
seem to have adopted a "permissive duplication of coverage"7' 1 approach
which provides for a master policy for the entire condominium but per-
07 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 277, and Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.277-1-3, 37 Fed.
Reg. 9278 (1972), discussed in note 66 supra. Also, the IRS might take the position that:
(a) the expenses of the corporation for the operation of the common areas unassociated
with the commercial facilities are not ordinary and necessary business expenses and thus
might not permit the deduction to the corporation; (b) where rent is "paid" by the
corporation so as to reduce the common area payments, an amount should be attributed
to the unit owners' common area payments, and thus to the corporation's income, equal
to an amount by which rental income from commercial facilities reduced the actual pay-
ments, which reduction helped discharge a legal obligation of the unit owners; and (c)
the application of rental income from commercial areas to reduce the unit owners'
common area expenses (or the direct payment of rent) is an economic benefit from the
corporation to its shareholders in the form of dividends, thus resulting in double taxa-
tion. See 1 ROHA, & RFSKIN § 15.06[2], where the authors discuss these possible arguments
and cite Chicago & W. Ind. R.R. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 310 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1962). In that case, the court, employing all three
arguments, held that where a group of railroad companies held stock of a terminal
corporation that serviced both owner and nonowner railroads, the net income from the
nonshareholder railroads constituted taxable income to the terminal railroad corporation
when applied to reduce charges to the shareholder railroads. Anderson's suggestion (see
text accompanying note 66 supra) is somewhat distinguishable in that the commercial
income is not directly being used to reduce unit owner expenses, but is being paid to
the unit owners as rent under a lease. However, this may be a difference in form over
substance.
68 See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
69The problems may be mitigated to some degree by providing for contribution in
the condominium association bylaws. For a discussion of this approach, see Lawrence,
supra note 40, at 799.
70 1 ROHAN g: RESKIN § 11.07 (footnote omitted).
711d. § 11.03[l], at 11-14.
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mits unit owners to acquire their own coverage. For example, the New
York statute states that the board of managers shall obtain coverage for
the "building" 72 if such coverage is "required by the declaration, the
by-laws or by a majority of the unit owners," but such insurance shall
be "without prejudice to the right of each unit owner to insure his own
unit for his own benefit." 73 There are many variations on this theme,
some which give the mortgagee the right to require the master cover-
age,74 and a few of which require such master coverage.75 While most
specifically permit individual policies,70 there are a few that remain
silent on this.77 None of the statutes adequately correlate the owner,
mortgagee, and association requirements.
The casualty insurance industry urges that "it is clearly preferable
that insurance on the building, including the customary building items,
be written in a single policy (or concurrent policies)."78 Most bylaw pro-
visions specify that the property will be insured by the association, usu-
72 The use of the word "building" is somewhat confusing. The act defines "building"
as a "multi-unit building or buildings, or a group of buildings whether or not attached
to each other, comprising a part of the property." N.Y. R.L PRop. LAW § 339-e(l)
(McKinney 1968). It would seem that such common facilities as swimming pools, cabanas,
and the like may be excluded from this definition. The statute, of course, is merely
permissive and provides for the insurance coverage only if the declaration, bylaws or
majority of unit owners require it. Since it is permissive, the next question is, is such
permission necessary, and if it is necessary, is the board of managers thereby precluded
from obtaining such blanket insurance for other than the "building"?
73Id. § 339-bb. The right of the unit owner to obtain his own insurance may be
essential, especially if he has made substantial improvements to his unit on his own.
74 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.25 (Spec. Pamphlet 1973): "[T]he manager or the
board of directors . . . at the request of the holder of a first mortgage of record covering
a unit, shall . .. obtain insurance for the property against the loss or damage by fire and
such other hazards under such terms and for such amounts as is . . . requested." A
mortgagee's dream?
75 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973), which provides.
inter alia, that "the manager or the board of managers shall have the authority to and
shall obtain insurance for the property against loss or damage by fire and such other
hazards as are covered under standard extended coverage provisions for the full
insurable replacement cost of the common elements and the units."
76 Rohan and Reskin note that faced with the question of duplication of coverage,
some attorneys active in the condominium field argue that the clause preserving the
unit owner's right to obtain insurance should be read as being limited: 1) to a situation
where the association has not purchased a master policy, or 2) to apply only to personal
property. It would seem that the authors are clearly correct when they state that "it
is extremely doubtful that either view can be supported." 1 ROHAN & RESKIN § I1.03[1],
at 11-14.1.
77See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.16 (Page 1971).
78 Fire, Cas. & Sur. Bull., Fire & Marine Vol., Misc. Fire Section, July 1966, at C-5.
The bulletin, published by the National Underwriter Company, goes on to explain that
if each owner had individual coverage, "it is easy to imagine the resultant problems with
Co-insurance requirements, maintenance of insurance to value (actual cash value or
replacement cost) and in adjusting losses which might involve several of the units plus
a part of the common elements of the building. For these same reasons a single policy
covering the entire condominium building is equally advantageous to the unit owner." Id.
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ally with permission for the individual unit owners to obtain their own
coverage.79 Unless the lender holds mortgages on a large proportion of
the units in a condominium, it will be difficult for the lender to main-
tain any right to approve the carrier or to control the amounts and types
of insurance obtained by the association under a master policy, even if
the bylaws, at the time the mortgages are made, specify adequate insur-
ance,80 although some state statutes require that the board of managers
obtain insurance "for the full insurable replacement cost of the com-
mon elements and the units."8' On the other hand, individual coverage
for each unit, while giving the mortgagee control over its adequacy,
may not provide funds to permit repair of common elements in the
event of major damage to the condominium. As a result, some combina-
tion of the two forms is needed. However, there are numerous as yet
unresolved problems, created not only by the very nature of the con-
dominium but also by the attempts to combine master and individual
coverage . 2 A discussion of some of the problems affecting the mortgagee
follows.
A. Application of Proceeds
The mortgagee normally wants the option to apply the insurance
proceeds to restoration or to reduction of the debt. This right may have
to be sacrificed if a viable condominium is to be established and, in-
deed, some statutes so provide.83 Clearly, the condominium association
cannot permit an individual mortgagee to thwart restoration plans by
insisting that its share of a master policy award be applied to his debt.
With respect to individual policies, the mortgagee could conceivably
have a freer hand, but even there the value of all the units will be af-
fected by the failure of one or more owners to restore.
Rohan and Reskin discuss an interesting solution contained in the
79 "Failure of project draftsmen to go further and correlate the insurance activities
of the unit owners, mortgagees, and association may merely reflect a carry-over of the
imprecision of the enabling legislation." 1 ROHAN & RESKIN § 11.03[3], at 11-20.
80 Bylaw provisions can generally be altered or repealed by a vote of a specified
percentage of unit owners.
81 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973). See Even, The Adminis-
tration of Insurance for Condominiums, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 204, 206-09 [hereinafter cited as
Even]. The Illinois statute does not provide for special types of insurance the mortgagee
may think important, such as coverage for contractual liability on leased equipment.
See id. at 209-12.
82 For an excellent general discussion of casualty insurance problems, see 1 ROHAN
& REsKIN §§ 11.01-.08.
83 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 313 (Smith-Hurd 1969). "Most commentators
suggest the mortgagee must give up his privilege of recapturing the loan from insurance
proceeds in order to keep the project viable." Wisner, Financing the Condominium in
New York: The Conventional Mortgage, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 32, 41 (1967) (footnote
omitted). See also Fegan, supra note 22, at 277.
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Strata Titles legislation of New South Wales, Australia, under which
the unit owner may purchase a separate policy which will pay a mort-
gagee who elects not to permit restoration, up to the policy limits, the
lesser of the mortgage principal balance or the amount of the loss, in
exchange for an assignment to the insurance company of the mortgage,
or so much thereof as equals the payment.8 4 The association will still
be paid under its master policy, so restoration can be consummated.
Since the risk to the casualty insurer is not that great, 5 the cost of a
separate mortgagee policy should not be excessive. Nevertheless, it does
represent an additional expense for the unit owner.
Absent a solution such as has been adopted by New South Wales,
the mortgagee may have to give up its option to apply the proceeds to
the debt. Since this option is not often exercised, it would not seem
that the loss, in and of itself, should cause very many lenders to decline
making condominium mortgage loans.
B. No Other Insurance
Some casualty policies contain a clause permitting an endorsement
which would prohibit the insured from obtaining other insurance
without the consent of the insurer. While the use of such an endorse-
ment is not de rigueur, a violation could render the insurance void. In
condominiums there is a danger that the company may claim that the
unit owner's coverage renders the master policy void or vice versa.86
The mortgagee's protection lies with the standard mortgagee clause
which is deemed to create an "independent or separate contract . ..
between the mortgagee and the insurer."87 Thus, the mortgagor's breach
of the no-other-insurance clause should not render the policy void as
against the mortgagee, 8 provided, of course, that the insurer has no
contract defense against the mortgagee89 and that the mortgagee clause
84 1 ROHAN & RESKIN § 11.06[4], at 11-44.
85 Recovery can only be had if the mortgagee refuses to allow the proceeds to be
applied to restoration. In such case, the restoration will nevertheless be accomplished
through the master policy and the casualty insurer, after paying the mortgagee, will receive
an assignment of the mortgage on the restored premises. Except for normal mortgage risks,
the casualty insurer's exposure on this additional policy would seem generally limited
to the difference between the mortgage interest rate and any higher current rate of
return on its investments at the time of recovery.
86 In instances where one company is the insurer of both policies, it is possible that
the principles of waiver or estoppel may be applied to prevent the company from
asserting such a claim. See generally 18 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW ch. 71
(2d ed. 1968).
87 11 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 42:694 (2d ed. 1963) (footnote
omitted).
88 Queens Ins. Co. v. People's Union Say. Bank, 50 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1931).
89 For example, it might be argued that knowledge by the mortgagee of a violation
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is so written to cover "acts or negligence" of the association and of unit
owners other than the mortgagor. The mortgagee clause, however, is
not wholly satisfactory since the insurer generally reserves the right to
cancel the policy subject to notice and a grace period for the mortgagee.
To a spot mortgagee, notice of cancellation of the master policy does not
really help that much.
C. Overlapping and Proration
When the association obtains a master policy and unit owners get
their own individual coverage, the result may be overlapping insur-
ance.90 This could result in recovery in excess of loss. The casualty
insurers would then undoubtedly argue for proration, under which
recovery, not in excess of the amount of the loss, would be shared by
the insuredsY1 Such a result would seem consistent with the theory that
the principle of "indemnity has long been the cornerstone of property
insurance law." 92 It could be a disaster to the condominium. There
might not be enough money for the association to restore the premises
or not enough money for the individual owners to satisfy the mortgage
debt. While there are certainly strong arguments against permitting
proration,9 3 the result remains uncertain.
While some standard mortgagee clauses may be "contributing" in
that they may contain specific language providing for proration with
other insurance on the insured property,94 most such clauses do not
provide for contribution and contain language to the effect that no
"act" of the mortgagor shall invalidate the mortgagee's insurance.9 5 It
has been held that this latter clause does not permit proration, 96
although this view is not unanimous.97 As discussed above, in any event,
of the policy terms may prevent recovery. See Union Trust Co. v. Philadelphia Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 127 Me. 528, 145 A. 243 (1929).
90 Both would seem to have an insurable interest since "[g]enerally speaking, a person
has an insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by or gain some advantage
by its continued existence and suffer some loss or disadvantage by its destruction. If he
would sustain such a loss, it is immaterial whether he has, or has not, any title in, or lien
upon, or possession of, the property itself." 3 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 24:13 (2d ed. 1960) (footnote omitted).
91 An illustration of a common proration clause can be found in the New York
Standard Fire Policy, lines 86-89, as set forth in N.Y. INS. LAw § 168 (McKinney 1966),
which states: "This Company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than
the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance covering the property
against the peril involved, whether collectible or not."
92 See Williams, The Principle of Indemnity: A Critical Analysis, 1960 INs. L.J. 471,
and material cited in n.l thereof.
93 See 1 RoHN & RESKIN § 11.04[2] for arguments on both sides.
94 See 3 W. FREEIDMAN, RICHARDS ON INSURANCE 1789-97 (5th ed. 1952).
95 See 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62:170 (2d ed. 1966).
96 See Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Bally, 19 Ariz. 580, 173 P. 1052 (1918).
97 See Sun Ins. Office v. Varble, 103 Ky. 758, 46 S.W. 486 (1898), where the court held
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the mortgagee clause does not prevent cancellation of the insurance.
Thus, it would be advisable for the mortgagee to require that the
master and individual policies provide that there be no proration.
Again, the spot mortgagee may find it difficult to control what goes
into the master policy and any bylaw requirements as to what goes into
individual policies.9 An alternative solution for the association is to
provide in the declaration that the unit owners assign to the association
that part of any recovery they receive which represents a reduction of
the association's award. This may help the association but might not
satisfy the mortgagee.
D. Subrogation
If recovery under the association's policy is occasioned by damage
caused by the negligence of a unit owner, or if there is a fire in a unit
owner's apartment caused by his negligence that does damage to a
neighbor's apartment, the association's or the neighbor's carrier, as the
case may be, may claim the right to bring an action against the negligent
unit owner through the right of subrogation.99
The enabling statutes afford no protection against subrogation,
and the condominium declarations generally do not contain a require-
ment that the policy contain a waiver of subrogation. "The insurer's
inclination to retain customer good will by voluntarily abandoning
its rights under the subrogation clause cannot be relied upon to resolve
this question in cases where a substantial loss is traceable to a financially
sound or insured unit owner." 100 A statutory solution is, of course, the
ideal way of meeting this problem. But until amending legislation is
enacted, protection may not be afforded unless there is a requirement in
the declaration that all policies held by the association or any unit
owner contain a waiver of subrogation, 1111 and such waivers are forth-
coming from the insurers. Alternatively, protection might be afforded
by a waiver by the association and the unit owners to the extent per-
mitted by law of the cause of action for negligence against each other.
In that case, there would be nothing for the casulty company to be
subrogated to.
that the mortgagee clause was limited by the general clause on contribution, citing Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 63 F. 925 (8th Cir. 1894), wherein, howeier, the contribution
provision was contained in the mortgagee clause itself.
98 The presence of a bylaw provision specifying the contents of unit policies raises the
question of whether or not such a restriction would be consistent with condominium
enabling legislation which grants to each unit owner the right to insure his own unit.
99 See generally 11 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrcE §§ 6501-05 (1944).
1001 ROHAN & RESKIN § 11.0513], at 11-33.
101 For typical language of such a waiver endorsement, see Even, supra note 81, at 215.
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While this problem might be troublesome to the institutional
mortgagee, it is not a crucial one. A large subrogation claim against
the mortgagor or against the association might result in the eventual
foreclosure of the mortgage but should not affect rights on foreclosure.
When the mortgagee becomes the owner, it would be subject to in-
surers' subrogation rights, but liability for the foreclosing mortgagee's
negligence is often covered adequately by its own insurance. Never-
theless, a solution to this problem would be desirable.
E. Conditions and Continuance
Most casualty policies contain conditions under which the insurer
may be relieved of liability if the insured violates certain provisions of
the policy. The most obvious is the failure to pay the premium. Others
include such breaches as arson, increase in hazard, and failure to report
losses.
The problem of breach of conditions is faced by all mortgagees.
But under the standard mortgagee clause, a breach will not invalidate
the insurance as against the mortgagee. If the insurance is to be can-
celled because of a breach of conditions, the mortgagee will receive
prior notice and have an opportunity to obtain substitute insurance,
normally at the mortgagor's expense.
With a condominium, the possibility that conditions will be vio-
lated increases manyfold, and if the insurance is cancelled the spot
mortgagee is not normally in a position to insure the entire condo-
minium to protect its investment. One solution is a clause in the policy
stating that there will be no cancellation of the master policy in the
event of a breach by a unit owner. With such a clause the insurer would
still be in a position to cancel with respect to the unit insurance, but
this would not put the mortgagee in any worse position than in the
normal mortgage situation.
Donald L. Anderson suggests102 that it may be possible to obtain a
clause in the master policy that the insurance will be renewed (and,
presumably, not terminated during its term) on partial default in pay-
ment of premium, due to default by some unit owners, if at least 60
percent of the premium is paid. The difficulty for the spot mortgagee,
as always, is being able to obtain and continue such protective clauses
in the master policy. Here, again, a statutory amendment covering
insurance could require such a clause in all master policies.
From the foregoing discussion of insurance problems, it would
102 Anderson, Condominiums, Fire, Cas. & Sur. Bull., Cas. Sur. Vol., Gen. Section, Dec.
1971, at B-1, B-5.
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seem that what is needed is a comprehensive statutory amendment
which would specify the type of insurance required for each condo-
minium- insurance which would protect the interests of the associa-
tion, the unit owner, and the mortgagee, and which is realistic enough
to specify insurance which can and will be written by the casualty in-
surers. For example, a master policy could be required with supple-
mentary group coverage for unit owners, containing waivers of both
subrogation and proration, and protection against termination. Elimi-
nation of all problems for the mortgagee is, of course, wishful thinking.
In balancing interests, undoubtedly the mortgagee will have to sacrifice
some of its rights, such as the right to apply the proceeds to the debt.
But if the statute specifies that an insurance trustee be appointed to
apply the proceeds to restoration and provision is made for sufficient
coverage to make the repairs, this loss would seem to be one that can
be accepted by the mortgagee.
Fortunately, much more attention has been paid recently to the
insurance problem of the condominium, and casualty insurers seem to
be working toward devising forms of policies to meet the needs of con-
dominiums.1 0 3 However, until a comprehensive statutory clarification
is accomplished, casualty insurance will continue to present numerous
problems for the mortgagee and certain risks will have to be taken,
especially where the mortgagee's loans do not cover a majority of the
units in the condominium.
The Single Mortgagee
In the absence of a statutory solution, many of the problems dis-
cussed above may be mitigated, or even avoided entirely, if the mort-
gagee holds mortgages on all or the vast majority of units.1 0 4 Of course,
the mortgagee, having made all or most of the mortgage loans on any
condominium, cannot be certain that these mortgages will not be
103 See, e.g., Kenyon, Insuring the Condominium, 19 PPAc. LAw, Nov. 1973 at 13,
where a new type of master policy for the condominium is discussed under which the
problems covered above could be reduced or eliminated. See also The Allstate Insurance
Companies' new Condominium Owners Policy which would provide personal property
and liability coverage in the unit and supplement the condominium association's insurance
on the common areas with "loss assessment coverage." Ins. News Digest, Aug. 20, 1973, at
4; J. of Commerce, Aug. 22, 1973, at 2. The Cotton Belt Insurance Company was the
first company to offer insurance for condominium officers and board members. I CONDO-
MINIUM REP. No. 7, Aug. 1973, at 3.
104 For example, a mortgagee of most of the units will probably not find himself
the owner of only one or a few units in a condominium where many other owners are
in default in common area payments. Also, through properly drafted default provisions in
the mortgages, the mortgagee can make certain that adequate casualty and liability
coverage is maintained.
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refinanced with other lenders or that upon sale of any unit the new
owner may procure financing elsewhere. While this may result in some
attrition, it should not present a serious obstacle as will be seen from
the discussion below.105
There are, however, several reasons why the institutional lender
may hesitate to take any action leading to its becoming the single
mortgagee for all the units in the condominium.
A. Antitrust
Manuel M. Gorman, then Assistant Counsel of the Life Insurance
Association of America (LIAA), in his article, Life Insurance and the
Anti-Trust Laws,10 recalled the statement of Louis D. Brandeis107
before a congressional committee in 1913. Brandeis said that when
businessmen came to him for advice on the antitrust laws, he warned
that he could not advise them how to walk precisely on the edge of a
cliff without falling off. But, he said, he could show them a path a few
yards back from the edge where they could walk with safety. Brandeis'
statement would seem applicable when it comes to attempts by the
mortgagee to garner all the loans in a particular condominium. If a
mortgagee should tell the developer that he will make the construction
loan'08 only on condition that he get all the long-term unit mortgages,
this might under some circumstances be construed as something similar
to a tying arrangement. 10 9 And where the institution is not involved in
105 See discussion of "The Lock-In" in text accompanying notes 129-30 infra.
100 6 J. AM. Soc'Y C.L.U. 20, 29-30 (1951). Mr. Gorman had been chief of the Special
Litigation Section of the U.S. Department of Justice before joining the LIAA, where
he is now Vice-President and General Counsel.
107 Later Mr. Justice Brandeis.
108 In the past, banks have been the major source of construction financing, and
the life insurance company has tended to avoid construction lending, perhaps because
of the inherent problems involved therein. However, in recent years, especially in connec-
tion with equity joint ventures in real estate, insurers have, with increasing frequency,
made or participated in construction loans. See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 5,
at 588.
109 Cf. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)
(Court held for petitioner, who claimed he was required to erect defendant's prefabricated
houses as a condition to obtaining loans); Fry v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 355 F.
Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (court, finding the McCarren Act inapplicable, see note 113
and accompanying text infra, refused to dismiss a complaint under the Sherman Act
which alleged a tying arrangement that plaintiff was required to purchase an irrigation
system and/or life insurance as a prerequisite to obtaining a farm loan); Stravides v.
Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (V.D. Pa. 1973) (court refused to
dismiss complaint that alleged a tying arrangement in that mortgagors were required
to keep escrow accounts for taxes and insurance with defendant institutions as a condition
to obtaining mortgage financing). Thomas H. Fegan, Associate General Counsel of
Equitable Life Assurance Society, stated in a PLI program that "the opinion exists in
some quarters that this practice [builder pressure on the purchaser to accept a mortgage
from the construction lender or to accept the release fee] may well be frowned on by
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the construction financing, but agrees to do the long term financing
only on condition that it be guaranteed all or a substantial portion of
the loans, a rather theoretical argument might lead to construing this
as an unlawful exclusive dealing arrangement under certain circum-
stances." 0
There are many arguments against the above actions constituting
antitrust violations. First, section 3 of the Clayton Act, which specifi-
cally proscribes exclusive dealing and tie-in arrangements, would not
appear applicable to loans of money, since by its terms it deals only
with sales or leases of commodities."' Thus, the conduct would have to
be attacked as an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act or possibly section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act." 2 Second, for the insurance company lender, it may be
possible to argue that the Sherman Antitrust Act is inapplicable under
the provisions of the McCarran Act"13 which provides, in effect, that the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act are inapplicable, with certain exceptions, "to the business
of insurance" to the extent that such business is regulated by state
law.14 Third, depending on the facts and details of the locality and the
particular condominium or condominiums involved, it would seem that
such conduct should not normally constitute a restraint on trade, or,
even if the conduct were held to constitute a restraint on trade, it would
appear difficult for the plaintiff to argue that such a restraint is un-
reasonable in light of the strong nonmonopolistic business reasons for
which such action has been taken.
the antitrust department as the use of economic pressure to stifle competition.- Fegan,
supra note 83, at 253.
110 See United States v. Charg-It, Inc., 1960 CCH TRADE CAS. j 69,870 (D. Md.), where
the court enjoined defendant from enforcing central credit service plan provisions having
the effect of limiting the use of other credit service plans. Cf. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
11 "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease or make
a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor . . . where the effect . . . may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). See United States v. Investors Diversified Servs.,
102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
112"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .. " Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The Federal
Trade Commission Act § 5 states that "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1970).
113 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
1141d. § 1012. The exceptions are boycott, coercion and intimidation.
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To the author's knowledge, the common practice in normal sub-
division development for the developer to arrange financing and in-
clude some of the costs thereof (e.g., legal fees, title insurance) in the
cost of the house, leaving the buyer the option of obtaining his own
financing at some additional expense, has, justifiably, not been attacked.
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, most lenders would want to
study the facts and law very carefully before taking any steps in this
area.
B. Liability
If a mortgagee is the sole mortgagee, or if loans by a specific mort-
gagee are encouraged or offered as part of the sale "package" by the
developer, the mortgagee will seem to become rather closely involved
in the condominium development. The credit of the developer will be
examined by the mortgagee. The plans and specifications may be sub-
ject to its approval. Its architects may periodically inspect the premises.
The presence of the mortgagee may be felt by the unit purchasers, who
may come to rely, however improperly, on his judgment regardless of
what exculpatory language is found in the agreements. And when
something goes wrong, it may be possible that they will attempt to look
to the mortgagee for recovery. This raises the question of whether the
mortgagee can be held liable for the negligence of the builder.
When the scale fell on Mrs. Palsgraf in that Long Island Railroad
station'15 - due to the explosion of a parcel containing fireworks
dropped by a man at the other end of the platform while being assisted
in boarding the train by railroad employees - Chief Judge Cardozo
of the New York Court of Appeals held that the railroad was not liable
to Mrs. Palsgraf because it was not within the range of reasonable
apprehension that the parcel would be a danger to others in the station.
The court said: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension...."I'll
While this doctrine of "duty" avoided liability for the Long Island
Railroad, it was the same doctrine which appears to have been the
basis of Judge Traynor's decision finding liability in Connor v. Great
Western Savings & Loan Association.117 Great Western was the mort-
gagee for a housing development and was rather closely associated with
the developer, although the court held that no joint venture was in-
115 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
116 Id. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100 (citations omitted).
117 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
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volved. 11 The agreement provided that Great Western would commit
itself to make a land acquisition loan and in return would be given the
right to make the construction loan and receive a "right of first re-
fusal"" 19 on the long-term loans made to the purchasers of homes. 120 In
order to protect its interest, Great Western employed a geologist to
check on the available quantity of water. As part of the "land ware-
housing" plan, Great Western actually took title to the land for a
period of time.12' Great Western knew that the developer was highly
undercapitalized and in weak financial condition. Having required
plans and specifications, Great Western did not examine the foundation
plans and made no recommendations as to the design or construction
of the houses, although its inspectors visited the property weekly to
verify that the building plans were being followed and that money
was disbursed only for work completed. 122 When the roof fell in, or, in
this case, the foundations, the court held, inter alia, that Great Western
had been negligent; that its intimate involvement with the construction
"took on ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money
lender;"' 123 that it knew or should have known of the soil and founda-
tion problems; and that it could have reasonably foreseen the risk of
harm to buyers of homes normally ill-equipped to discern the structural
defects. 124 It owed and breached a "duty [of] ...reasonable care to
prevent the construction and sale of seriously defective homes' ' 12 5 and
was held liable.
By stating that this lender went beyond the usual money lender's
domain, the court implies that the normal mortgagee, acting within his
usual domain, would not be subject to liability. What the "usual
domain" of a mortgagee is, however, may be subject to some question.
118 Id. at 863, 447 P.2d at 615, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 375. See discussion in text accompany-
ing notes 197-201 infra.
119 Id. at 858, 447 P.2d at 612, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 372. If a buyer wished to obtain
other financing, Great Western had 10 days to meet the other terms. If Great Western,
having met the other terms, still did not get the loan, the developer agreed to pay
Great Western the "fees and interest" obtained by the other lender in connection with
the loan. Id. at 861, 447 P.2d at 614, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
120 It should be noted that while the issue did not come before the court, there
justifiably does not appear to have been any contention that the right of first refusal
under the circumstances of the case constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
121 The arrangement . . . was an early example of . . . 'land warehousing.'
Under such an arrangement, a financial institution holds land for a developer
until he is ready to use it. Unlike a normal bailee of personal property, however,
the institution retains title to the property as well as the right to possession.
69 Cal. 2d at 859, 447 P.2d at 613, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
122 Id. at 860-62, 447 P.2d at 613-15, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373-75.
123 Id. at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
124 Id. at 864-67, 447 P.2d at 616-18, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376-78.
1251d. at 867, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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In any case, the result in Great Western would probably not occur now
in California because of the adoption of a clarifying statute,'126 and the
decision has not been followed or has been properly distinguished in
other cases.127 But the danger remains. In a condominium situation,
where a lender is making all or a vast majority of the long term unit
loans, and may also be directly involved in the construction lending, it
is possible that these questions may arise again.1
28
C. The Lock-In
Some executives of lenders that have engaged in the financing of
condominiums are not at all happy that their institutions hold most of
the mortgages for particular condominiums. They have complained
that when they have made all or most of the loans in a condominium,
other lenders shy away from refinancing or making loans to second
generation purchasers of condominium units. When prospective pur-
chasers, or owners seeking refinancing, go to lenders, they are told that
it would not be worth the lender's while to examine all the condo-
minium documents and take the risks associated with being a spot
mortgagee for the size of the proposed mortgage investment.129
In these circumstances, the original institution may discover that
126 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West 1970) provides:
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or may be
used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construction, repair,
modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale or lease to
others, shall not be held liable to third persons for any loss or damage oc-
casioned by any defect in the real or personal property so designed, manufactured,
constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for any loss or damage resulting
from the failure of the borrower to use due care in the design, manufacture,
construction, repair, modification or improvement of such real or personal
property, unless such loss or damage is a result of an act of the lender outside
the scope of the activities of a lender of money or unless the lender has been
a party to misrepresentations with respect to such real or personal property.
It should be noted, however, that the Great Western court found the lender's
involvement "beyond the domain of the usual money lender," see text accompanying
note 123 supra, which language is similar to "outside the scope of the activities of a
lender of money" in the above quoted statute.
127 See, e.g., Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969); Cal-
laizakis v. Astor Dev. Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972). Cf. Rice v. First
Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 207 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 879
(1968). But see Kornitz v. Earling Heller, Inc., 49 Wis. 2d 97, 181 N.W.2d 403 (1970).
128 Traditionally, mortgage lenders have taken the position that they owed
no duty to borrowers as to the value or condition of the mortgaged security.
Any inspections of the property made by the lender were solely for the benefit of
the lender. We may be entering into a new era insofar as that relationship is
concerned.
Fegan, supra note 83, at 287.
129 The purchaser is in no position to shop. The feeling is that the task of
examining all of the documentation of a condominium project is too time-
consuming to justify another lending institution undertaking it for the purpose
of processing one or two loans.
Id. at 254.
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only it will be able to make successive loans, and all kinds of moral and
other pressures may force it to do so, even when it would prefer not to.
Thus, this side of the coin is not much shinier than the other, and the
mortgagee may think twice before it becomes too heavily involved in
any particular condominium development. Some solution to this prob-
lem, however, may be in the making. Recently, the New York State
Home Builders' Association, concerned by the reluctance of banks to
become spot mortgagees on condominiums, began the preparation of
model condominium documents which, once approved by the mort-
gagee, need not be restudied with each new condominium spot mort-
gage made. However, upon learning that the New York Attorney
General's office was also preparing model forms, the committee formed
by the Home Builders' Association, suspended drafting activities await-
ing the printing of the Attorney General's forms which should be
released shortly. 30 There is no question that model forms, if they
achieve wide acceptance, combined with statutory amendment to
correct some of the problems herein discussed, would go a long way to
facilitate and encourage spot mortgage investments in condominiums.
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AS CONDOMINIUM SPONSOR
In connection with joint ventures or other equity investments, the
institutional investor may receive proposals involving the construction
and sale of condominium units perhaps by the institution itself, but
most likely as a partner or venturer with a real estate developer.
If the institution agrees to undertake such a development, it will
become a sponsor of a condominium, subject to all the problems gen-
erally faced by developers in this area, as well as some which affect only
the institution. In this part of the paper, an attempt will be made to
cover a few of the major problem areas of current interest with a view
to aiding the institutional investor in making a more intelligent deci-
sion in any particular fact situation as to whether to become a condo-
minium sponsor.
Investment Law Limitations
Statutory limitations on investments of institutional lenders may
create roadblocks to institutional sponsorship of condominiums. Such
limitations on insurance company investments in real estate are illus-
trative of the problems faced by many types of institutions in this area.
After World War II, many states amended their insurance laws to
130 Interview with William Parry, Esquire, whose office participated in the drafting
of the New York State Home Builders' Association forms.
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permit investment in real estate for the production of income. New
York added paragraph (h) to section 81(7) in 1946131 and provided that
if the property was not income producing at the time it was acquired,
it could nevertheless be purchased if there were an existing program
to make the property income producing. New Jersey authorized owner-
ship of real estate for the production of income as early as 1945132 and
Massachusetts in 1947.133 By 1957, David J. Bannon, Jr., in a paper for
The Association of Life Insurance Counsel 34 was able to state:
Apart from constitutional considerations, the privilege of owner-
ship of income producing real property is rapidly achieving uni-
versal acceptance. Where required, permissive legislation has
taken place on a country-wide scale with real obstacles remaining
only in South Dakota and Texas but favorable legislation is even
now reported pending in the latter State.135
A constitutional problem was settled in Michigan in 1963 by
amendment to its constitution and implementing legislation. 36 In
1966, South Dakota came into the fold,'137 and, in 1967, Texas permitted
ownership of income producing real estate with, however, some signifi-
cant limitations.138
The unanswered question in this legislation with respect to con-
dominium sponsorship, however, is whether the purchase of land for
improvement and sale is an investment for the production of income
within the meaning of the applicable laws. On the negative side, the
argument is that the purchase of land for sale at a profit is a speculation
whether or not the institution invests money in the land by improving
the real estate prior to sale.
On the other hand, it would seem that the line between specula-
tion and investment should not be drawn in this manner. Why should
131 N.Y. LAWS [1946] ch. 509, § 1, as amended N.Y. INS. LAW § 81(7)(h) (McKinney
Supp. 1972).
132 Act of Apr. 24, 1945, ch. 226, § 1, [1945] N.J. Acts 736.
133 Act of Apr. 17, 1947, ch. 269, § 1 [1947] Mass. Acts & Resolves 250.
134 Bannon, Company Ownership of Real Estate Under Existing Investment Laws,
13 Ass'N OF LIFE INS. COUNSEL PRoc. 453 (1957). Mr. Bannon is Associate General Counsel
of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.
135 Id. at 455. For a short review of the history of laws with respect to life insurance
company investments in income producing real property, see Roegge, Talbot & Zinman,
supra note 5, at 579-83.
136 A new constitution in 1963 omitted most of what had been Article XII, Section 5
of the previous constitution which had imposed restrictions on corporate ownership of
real estate. See also Act of Aug. 19, 1969, no. 318, § 947, [1969] Mich. Pub. Acts 676.
137 See Act of Feb. 8, 1966, ch. 11, § 30(6), S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 58-27-50
(6) (1967).
138 The Texas limitations include a restriction on the purchase of undeveloped real
estate for the purposes of development or subdivision. Act of June 17, 1967, ch. 660,
§ 1, [1967] Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1753.
1974]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
a purchase of land for the purpose of improvement and sale be con-
sidered a speculation? Why is "profit" not "income"? While it is pos-
sible that the purchase of raw land to be held with the hope of an in-
creased price on resale could under many circumstances be considered
a mere speculation, improvement of raw land with buildings or even
the conversion of raw land into building lots, for the purpose of sale,
would seem to be a method of producing income and no more a spec-
ulation than the building of improvements on raw land for the purpose
of leasing. Since the investment is recovered once the property is sold
there may, in fact, be less of a risk when a building is built for sale than
when it is built for lease, for while the rental market may be good at the
time the building is constructed, it may be bad when the initial leases
expire and new tenants have to be found. This reasoning has generally
been adopted by the New York Insurance Department in a recent in-
formation letter.139
In light of the dramatic growth in the use of condominiums
throughout the nation,' 40 it would appear that such rulings should be
forthcoming in other states having similar legislative or constitutional
authorization for investment in real estate for the production of in-
come, and it is understood that there have been other private rulings
to this effect. However, until the appropriate department having juris-
diction has spoken, institutional investors must act with caution.
Federal and State Regulation
Once the hurdle of state investment laws and regulations is passed,
the institutional sponsor of a condominium is faced with all the prob-
lems normally associated with condominium development, a major one
of which is compliance with any applicable laws and regulations includ-
ing federal securities and state blue sky laws. Perhaps the problems of
the large institutions are even greater than those of the normal sponsor.
Generally, the institutional investor will not build and sell the con-
dominium on its own. More likely, it will act with a developer-partner,
who will be in charge of the day-to-day operation of the venture, con-
sulting with the institution only in cases involving major decisions.' 4'
In this context the institution is concerned that its partner may, without
139 Letter from the New York Insurance Department to William F. Leahy, Vice
President, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, May 7, 1971.
140 See note 4 supra.
141 See Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 5, at 630-34. Because of the possibilities
of exposure to liabilities, some institutions would prefer the limited partnership ap-
proach. Compare Groothuis & Cohen, Lile Insurance Company Investments in Limited
Real Estate Partnerships, 21 Ass'N OF LiFE INS. COUNSEL PRoc. 433, 436-40 (1970), with
Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, supra note 5, at 600-13.
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authorization, violate some requirement of applicable law and that it
might be argued that the institution is liable under principles of agency
or under the "controlling persons" sections of the 1933 and 1934 federal
securities acts.142
It is still not completely clear to what extent federal securities laws
are applicable to condominiums, which are generally sold as real estate
for the purchaser's own use, and not as securities. 4 3 However, for some
time there has been concern that certain types of condominium offer-
ings may nevertheless be subject to federal regulation,'144 and in January
1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) confirmed this
fear when it issued Securities Act Release No. 5347.145 Said the Com-
mission: "The SEC notes that certain offers and sales of condominium
units . . . may involve the offering of securities within the meaning
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. In addition, persons en-
gaged in the business of buying or selling such securities may be re-
quired to register as brokers or dealers under the Exchange Act. 1 46
What are these "certain offers and sales of condominium units?"
The SEC noted that the ordinary sale of a condominium is the sale of an
interest in real estate and that the "offer of real estate as such, without
any collateral arrangements with the seller or others, does not involve the
offer of a security."'1 47 However, citing SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 148 a
1946 Supreme Court decision involving the sale and operation of orange
groves, the reasoning of which case could be applicable to condo-
miniums, 149 the SEC stated that where there is a rental pool or other
such arrangement'5" offered with the condominium unit, it is possible
142 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). A person can be liable under
these sections even if there is only "some indirect means of discipline or influence short
of actual direction." Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
143 See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §§ 2.14-.15 (1972).
144 See generally JA ROHAN & RESKIN §§ 18.01-.05.
145 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973), in [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FE . SEC. L. REP. 79,163, at 82,535 [hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 5347].
For an interesting discussion of the origins of this release and the Report of the Real
Estate Advisory Committee to the SEC upon which the release was based, see Dickey &
Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y.L.F. 473 (1974).
146 SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 145, at 82,535-36.
147 Id. at 82,536.
148 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
149 SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 145, at 82,539.
150 Typically, the rental pool is a device whereby the promoter or a third party
undertakes to rent the unit on behalf of the actual owner during that period of
time when the unit is not in use by the owner. The rents received and the
expenses attributable to rental of all the units in the project are combined and
the individual owner receives a ratable share of the rental proceeds regardless
of whether his individual unit was actually rented.
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that a form of investment contract is being offered in that the unit
purchaser might be led to expect a return on his investment from the
managerial efforts and expertise of others.' 51 The release makes it clear
that the following will cause the offering to be viewed as an offering of
securities in the form of investment contracts:
(1) If the condominiums, with any rental arrangement or similar
service, are offered and sold with emphasis on the economic
benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the manager's
expertise in renting the units. 1 52
(2) If there is an offering of participation in a rental pool arrange-
ment. (It could be argued from this that if an offered service
fits within the definition of a rental pool, an offering of secu-
rities might be involved regardless of whether emphasis was
placed on the economic benefits to be derived from the man-
ager's expertise.)153
(3) If the owner is materially restricted in his occupancy or rental
of his unit by virtue of the rental or similar arrangement.
(Examples given are requirements that the unit owner hold the
unit available for rental for any part of the year or that he use
an exclusive rental agent.)154
The release goes on to state that where commercial facilities are
a part of the common elements of a residential project, "no registra-
tion'55 would be required under the investment contract theory" if the
income is used "only to offset common area expenses" and the facilities
are "incidental to the project as a whole and are not established as a
primary income source for the individual owners. ."156 However,
151 Id.
152 Id. at 82,539-40.
153 But see SEC No-action letter re: Culverhouse, Tomlinson, Mills, DeCarion &
Anderson (Oct. 5, 1973), in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,612, at
83,639, and SEC No-action letter re: Big Sky of Montana, Inc. (Mar. 14, 1973), discussed in
199 BNA SEC. REG. 8c L. REP. Apr. 25, 1973, at C-1, where rental services were available
but their use not required. However, in SEC No-action letter re: North Shore Project
(Mar. 14, 1973), discussed in 194 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. Mar. 21, 1973, at C-2, the SEC
indicated that while notice of the availability of rental services will not in itself make
the condominium a security, the discussion of tax and other economic benefits from
rental might.
154 SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 145, at 82,540.
155 Registration expenses for condominiums have ranged from $125,000 for 81 units to
$4000 for 84 units, taking 32 days to one year to complete. Ellsworth, Condominiums
are Securities? 2 REAL ESrATE L.J. 694, 699 (1974). The author explains that the $4000-32
day registration was that of the Inn of the Seventh Mountain Phase IV where the forms
were typed, a subsidiary acted as issuer, and no counsel fees were "paid" because inside
corporate counsel prepared the statements.
156 SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 145, at 82,540.
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this leaves some unanswered questions. 5 7 Since the exemption from
registration is specifically limited to the "investment contract theory,"
is the SEC hinting that there are other theories on the basis of which
the securities laws may be applicable which may be revealed at a later
date? Do such commercial facilities make the offering an offering of a
security under the investment contract theory and subject to all require-
ments of the federal security laws other than registration?' 58 Why is the
exemption limited to "residential" projects and what kind of project
is it when there are both residential and commercial condominium
units? What happens if the commercial facilities are designed only to
offset common area expenses, but, as it turns out in practice, they
make a profit in addition? When are commercial facilities only "inci-
dental" to the condominium and not established as a "primary income
source" for the owners? In the light of questions such as these, it may
be that this "exemption" for commercial facilities is really a "warning."
The release concludes with a caveat:159
The Commission, therefore would like to remind those engaged in
the offering of condominiums or other interests in real estate with
similar features that there may be situations, not referred to in this
release, in which the offering of the interests constitutes an offering
of securities. Whether an offering of securities is involved neces-
sarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. The staff of the Commission will be available to respond to
written inquiries on such matters. 60
In addition to the SEC, a condominium sponsor must deal with
any applicable state blue sky regulatory body. Several states require
157 Other questions are already being answered. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5382 (Apr. 9, 1973), in [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REt'. 79,309, at
82,938, dealing with permitted advertising and sales practices. See Clurman, Condomin-
iums As Securities: A Current Look 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974) for a discussion of recent
developments.
158 A recent decision involving Co-Op City, a large cooperative in the Bronx, New
York City, held that the offering of stock of a cooperative was the offering of stock and
an investment contract under the securities laws. Forman v. Community Services, Inc.,
500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Notwithstanding
the fact that tenant shareholders were prevented from making any profit on the resale
of the stock, the court said, they had an expectation of income, inter alia, because they
would "share in the income from the leasing of retail establishments, office space, parking,
and other commercial enterprises on the premises." 500 F.2d at 1254. It is assumed that
such income was used only to offset common area expense. See 1050 Tenants Corp. v.
Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974), where the
court found that shares in a cooperative housing corporation were "securities" or "invest-
ment contracts." In this case there was no restriction on resale price.
159 SEC Release No. 5347, supra note 145. at 82,540.
160 For example, see SEC Staff Reply, The Innisfree Corp. (April 5, 1973), [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 79,398.
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registration of all condominium projects whether or not they involve a
rental pool or other such arrangement.' 61 The New York requirements
are rather comprehensive. Under regulations issued by the New York
Attorney General 62 pursuant to statutory authorization, 16 3 an offering
statement must be filed in connection with all condominiums, whether
or not the offering amounts to the offering of a "security."' 164 The
offering statement must include an "offering plan" containing "a full
and fair summary of all the material facts relating to the offering."' 65
The required contents of the offering plan are spelled out in detail, and
the regulations require information on 44 items in addition to those
required by statute. 16 6 The items required by the regulations include
details on assessment for real estate tax purposes; restrictions on aliena-
tion, sale, lease, etc.; a detailed description of the nature of expendi-
tures for operation and management; insurance required to be pro-
vided; relevant details concerning the condominium regime (16 are
specified); and "[e]stimates of the aggregated common receipts and
expenditures . . .for the first year of operations and estimates of the
common charges and other expenditures for each individual condo-
minium interest for such period, together with the qualificatons of the
party making such estimates."'167 One wonders whether these security
style disclosure requirements make sense when applied to condo-
miniums. Does the voluminous prospectus inform the purchaser, or
does it hide from the purchaser the relevant facts in a sea of detail?
Whatever the advisability of the disclosure approach to condominium
regulation, it is being employed, and as can be seen from just this ab-
breviated list of New York disclosure requirements, there is plenty of
room for error and plenty of room for lawsuits concerning the errors.
For example, in what, if successful, may become the largest con-
dominium in the world, the owners of Parkchester, 168 in their attempt
161 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 514-36 (1968); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.88 (Supp. 1974) (exemption available for,
inter alia, "commercial, industrial, or other nonresidential" condominiums, id. § 55-79.87).
See generally I ROHAN & RESKIN § 3.05.
162 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.1-5 (1964).
163 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(6) (McKinney 1968).
'64 Id. § 352-e(1)(a) (Supp. 1973); 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.1 (1964).
165 13 N.Y.C.R.R. 19.1(b) (1964).
166 Id. 19.2.
167 Id. For a thorough analysis of New York condominium registration, see Levine,
Registering A Condominium in New York, 19 N.Y.L.F. 495 (1974).
168 Parkchester, located in the easterly portion of the Bronx in New York City,
was acquired and constructed in the late 1930's and early 1940's by Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company. Sold to a group headed by Harry B. Helmsley in 1968, Parkchester
houses over 12,000 families.
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to condominiumize the north quadrant thereof, 69 were sued on the
ground that the offering plan is alleged not to have contained a full and
fair summary of the material facts relating to the offering, as required
by the Attorney General's regulations. The suit against the owners was
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment,' 70 but a companion suit
against the Attorney General for approving the prospectus is still pend-
ing before the New York Court of Appeals.' 71
In what is probably the largest cooperative in the world, Co-Op
City,172 the sponsors, in an action brought under the federal securities
laws, '7 3 are now being sued by the cooperative owners for, inter alia,
alleged errors concerning construction costs and carrying charges con-
tained in an information bulletin distributed to prospective pur-
chasers. 7 4
If federal securities and state blue sky laws were not enough, con-
dominium sponsors must also now contend under certain circumstances
with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of 1968,175 notwithstand-
169 See note 202 infra.
170 Whalen v. Parkchester Apts. Co., 170 N.Y.LJ. 55, Sept. 18, 1973, at 19, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County).
171 See Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 44 App. Div. 2d 442, 355 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1974).
172 Co-Op City is located in Baychester, a northerly section of The Bronx in New
York City, former site of the ill-fated Freedomland Amusement Park. It houses over
15,000 families.
1731Forman v. Community Servs, Inc., Civil No. 72-3980 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 19,
1972). The class action was brought under, inter alia, "The Securities Laws of the United
States, including, without limitation, sections 10, 20, and 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . rule lOb-5 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities
Exchange Act . . . and sections 17(a) and 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 .... "
Amended Complaint at 2. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that shares of stock in this cooperative did not constitute securities within the purview
of federal law, 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), but the Second Circuit disagreed and
remanded for trial. 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974). See note 158 supra.
174 One of the allegations is that the information bulletin, as amended, estimated,
inter alia, construction costs at $258,507,750 pursuant to a guaranteed cost lump sum
construction contract, but that the contract was successively amended and the construction
costs successively increased by $81,997,250 to a total of over $340,500,000. See Amended
Complaint at 10-13, 17-20.
175 15 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1971). The Act is intended to deter interstate land sales
made through material misrepresentations relating to the property. Its provisions require
developers selling or leasing fifty or more unimproved lots under a common promotional
plan to prepare two disclosure statements. The first, called "the statement of record,"
is a registration statement which must be filed with the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). The second is a "property report" which must be submitted to the
purchaser prior to sale. Id. § 1703(a)(1). The required disclosures range from a legal
description of the land to a statement of the present condition of access to the subdivision.
See id. § 1705. If the promoter fails to supply the purchaser with a property report in
advance of the signing of the contract, the buyer may rescind. Furthermore, the report
must be in the hands of the purchaser at least 48 hours prior to his signing or the
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ing the fact that the Act in section 1702(a)(3) exempts from registration
thereunder, inter alia, sales of existing buildings and sales of land under
contracts obligating sellers to erect buildings on the land within two
years. The problem for the condominium sponsor is determining when
the condominium is completed for the purposes of this regulation.
The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration has issued guide-
lines interpreting the exemption' 6 which require a contract obligating
the seller to erect a building or condominium unit within the two
year period subject only to delays legally supportable in the jurisdiction
as impossible of performance for reasons beyond the developer's con-
trol. For primary residence condominiums in metropolitan areas, the
contract is deemed completed when the condominium unit is ready for
occupancy, but "in the case of sale of condominiums in which the
promotion of the common facilities is the primary inducement to
purchase" (as may be the case in certain recreational developments), the
expected completion of these common facilities must be concomitant
with the expected completion of the condominium unit.'7 7
In addition to the exemption for finished projects, avoidance of
registration is also possible if each unit purchaser makes a personal on-
site inspection of the property prior to the signing of his contract. 78
Such all-inclusive inspection may be next to impossible for "hinter-
land" condominiums advertised over long distances, but it may provide
buyer will have a right of rescission for three business days after signing. Id. § 1703(b),
as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 812(c)(1)(A) (Aug. 22, 1974).
Noncompliance with the Act exposes the sponsor to numerous liabilities. For example.
he may be sued for damages by "any person acquiring a lot in the subdivision" for an
"untrue statement of a material fact or omission" in the statement of record, and the orig-
inal purchaser has a cause of action for misrepresentations in the property report. Id.
§ 1709(a), (b). The Secretary of HUD may enjoin the sale of lots for noncompliance with
the Act, id. § 1714, and there are criminal penalties for willful violations. Id. § 1717.
176 39 Fed. Reg. 7824 (1974). The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR)
contends that a condominium project is "equivalent to a subdivision, each unit being
a lot." 38 Fed. Reg. 23,866 (1973). Opposition to registration of condominium develop-
ments has been based on the argument that condominiums are the equivalent of houses,
the sale of which was not intended to be covered by the Act. OILSR counters, "[T]he
right to condominium space is a form of ownership, not a structural description." Id.
177 39 Fed. Reg. 7824, 7825 (1974).
178 See 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(10) (1971). This exemption also requires that at the time
of sale the real estate must be free of all liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims. Id.
Whereas the other statutory exemptions require no formal approval, when on-site inspec-
tion is employed, the promoter must, inter alia, submit an exemption claim to the Secre-
tary of HUD and must present the purchaser with a statement disclosing reservations and
restrictions, taxes, and assessments. See 38 Fed. Reg. 23,876-77 (1973). It should be noted
that the latter items must merely be disclosed to the purchaser; they do not necessarily
constitute "liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims" which would disqualify the sale from
exemption. Id. at 23,877. There are additional minor exemptions, both in the Act and the
regulations, which should not be overlooked. See 15 U.S.C. § 1702 (1971); 38 Fed. Reg.
23.876-77 (1973).
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a viable alternative for metropolitan projects intended for a more local
market. It has also been suggested that metropolitan condominiums
are less likely than their rural counterparts to require registration
because the developer will probably be able to deliver a completed unit
within two years after the sale.179 Notwithstanding the exemptions,
it is possible under these regulations that many phase developments
might be subject to the Act.
Not to be left out, the Federal Reserve Board, charged with the
responsibility of implementing the Truth-in-Lending Act,180 formu-
lated Regulation Z1 11 and has explained how that regulation might be
applicable to condominium sales.182 Under that interpretation, a
sponsor can be brought within the Act's coverage: 1) if he personally
extends credit to the purchaser, imposing a finance charge for the credit;
2) if he negotiates an installment sale contract; or 3) if he "arranges for
the extension of credit," such as by obtaining a commitment from a
mortgage lender to provide the buyer's financing.183
In addition to complying with the foregoing, the sponsor must also
satisfy various agencies that the project will have no adverse effect on
the environment. In some states statutory requirements are very com-
prehensive. 84
179 See 1 CONDOMINIUM REP., Nov. 1973, at 2.
180 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). The Truth-in-Lending Act, intended to assure
"meaningful disclosure of credit terms," is Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act of 1968. For a general discussion of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure requirements
and penalties for noncompliance, see Bowmar, Truth-in-Lending: A Look at Some Real
Estate Ramifications, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 231 (1970). For an insight into the Truth-in-
Lending regulation philosophy, see Garwood, Truth in Lending-A Regulator's View,
29 Bus. LAw. 193 (1973).
181 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1973).
182 See Excerpts from Federal Reserve Board Public Position Letter No. 676 (Mar. 8,
1973), in 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDrT GUIDE 30,954 (1973).
183 Id.
184 In California, for example, there are special acts designed to protect the environ-
ment from ill-conceived building projects. Under the Environmental Quality Act of 1970,
CAL. PUB. RSoURcES CODE § 27,000 et seq. (West Supp. 1973), local planning agencies must
prepare "environmental impact" reports prior to the issuance of certain use and building
permits. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972), the developer secured a bona fide building permit from the
planning commission, only to have the project blocked because of the commission's failure
to prepare a report considering "whether the proposed condominium construction 'may
have a significant effect on the environment.'" Id. at 202, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 771. Although the burden of preparing the environmental impact report is on the
local planning agency, the agency may demand the submission of pertinent data and
information from the developer. See CAL. PUB. REsOURCEs CODE § 21,160 (West Supp.
1973).
Under the Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUB. REsOURCS CODE § 21,160
(West Supp. 1973), a developer of coastline property must secure permission to build from
a regional state agency charged with the duty of considering the project's effect on the
coastal environment. One such agency was unsuccessful in restraining an allegedly un-
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Thus, becoming a sponsor of a condominium development is not
only as difficult, complicated, and risky as entering into any joint
venture, but it is also more troublesome because of the added com-
plications of federal and state regulation. Such an undertaking should
not be commenced without deliberate and careful consideration of the
numerous problems involved.
The Expanding Condominium
For obvious business considerations many large condominium
projects are built in phases. 8 5 The institution, perhaps because it is
often capable of investing larger sums of money than other lenders,
may be involved in many of these "phase" transactions.
In the phase development, the percentage interests of the unit
owners in the common areas will fluctuate during the period the various
phases are being constructed and sold. For example, assume a three
phase condominium of 200 units each. The first phase is built along
with a swimming pool, golf course and other facilities intended for
eventual use by all three phases. When phase one is completed, each
unit owner will have a 1/200 interest in these common facilities; when
phase two is completed, a 1/400 interest; and when phase three is
completed, a 1/600 interest. 88 The problem is that much of the
enabling legislation either severely restricts or will not permit these
fluctuations.
This legislation often requires that the common facilities be de-
scribed with particularity in the declaration and that the common
interest appurtenant to each unit be shown by an appropriate per-
centage as of the date of the declaration 87 and have a permanent char-
authorized condominium because substantial demolition and construction had begun
prior to the effective date of the Act. See San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the
Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 893, 513 P.2d 129, 131, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1973).
185The prudent developer will generally build his condominium project in phases
where he has not obtained a substantial amount of advance sales. Phasing provides the
developer with an opportunity to test the condominium market rather than to begin
construction of the entire project and thereby assume that risk "of a hybrid project,
where the developer winds up as the landlord of a substantial number of units because
of his inability to sell them." Bohan, A Lawyer Looks at Residential Condominiums, 7
REAL PROP., PROB. TR. J. 7, 13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bohan]. See discussion in text
at notes 175-79 supra with respect to the application of the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act to certain "phase" developments.
186The unit owner's decreasing interest in the common areas may not, in reality,
be as severe as illustrated above. With each additional phase there may be some addi-
tional common areas added so that while the fractional interest is smaller, the area being
fractioned is larger.
187 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 347 A-6 (1966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.04(B) (1970);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 505 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 91.610(1) (1971). The New York
statute, N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW § 339-i(l) (McKinney 1968), was recently amended to give
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acter that may not be altered without the consent of all unit owners
affected, expressed in an amended declaration. 88 Obviously, provisions
such as these will prevent the successive reduction of each unit owner's
interest in common areas unless the affected unit owners agree, a con-
tingency far too risky for the prudent condominium developer.189 Some
suggest starting with the largest possible condominium contemplated
under which, in the three phase example discussed above, each phase
one unit owner would be given a 1/600th interest in the common areas
at the start, although there are at that time only 200 unit owners. Then,
if all the projected units are in fact built, the percentages will be correct.
But this might not comply with the statute and would require amend-
ment of documents to withdraw unsold units.190 This would not seem
to be a satisfactory solution.
A better method is the so-called "chinese menu" approach. Here,
"[t]he declaraton sets forth in columns A,B,C, etc., what the percentage
of interest of each unit will be in the common property"' 9'1 if one phase
is built, if two phases are built, and so forth. The theory is that this sets
forth the common interest as of the date of the declaration as is re-
quired by statute. Furthermore, since what is conveyed, ab initio, is a
fluctuating interest as specifically set forth in the declaration, this
interest has a permanent character and is not "altered" as the fluctua-
tions specified in the declaration become effective. Consent of the unit
owners would continue to be required if the percentages set forth in
flexibility in fixing the initial percentage of common elements attributable to each unit.
N.Y. Sass. LAWs [1974], ch. 1056, § 2(1) (McKinney). Four options are provided based upon
proportionate value; approximate proportionate floor area; equal percentages; and floor
space "subject to the location of such space and the additional factors of relative value
to other space in the condominium, the uniqueness of the unit, the availability of common
elements for exclusive or shared use, and the overall dimensions of the particular unit."
Id. The latter option is the only one of the four that does not specify that it is set as of
the date of filing the declaration, but this omission may have been inadvertent.
188 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-i(2) (McKinney 1968). As recently amended, this sec-
tion permits later division of nonresidential condominium units and the common interests
appurtenant thereto. N.Y. Sass. LAws [1974], ch. 1056, § 2(2) (McKinney).
189 A power of attorney to give consent at a later date, or a consent itself given at
the time the unit is purchased may be attempted. But death or incompetence of the
unit owner may render the power of attorney ineffective, and one cannot feel completely
confident that the courts will recognize the earlier consent as meeting the statutory
requirements over the strenuous objections of a unit owner. With respect to powers of
attorney, see Buck, Condominiums that Grow- Another View, LAWYERS TITLE NEWs,
Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 11, 12-13 [hereinafter cited as Buck]; Krasnowiecki, Townhouse Con-
dominiums Compared to Conventional Subdivision With Homes Association, 1 REAL
EsrATE L.J. 323, 357-58 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki].
100 Rohan, Second Generation Condominium Problems: Construction of Enabling
Legislation and Project Documents, 1 VALPARAIso U.L. Rv. 77, 88 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Second Generation Condominium Problems].
191 Bohan, supra note 185, at 14.
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the declaration were to be changed. It now appears that title companies
are willing to insure a condominium structured in this manner under
certain circumstances. 192
Absent the "chinese menu" approach, the alternative seems to be to
build a series of small separate condominiums with all the attendant
expenses of separate prospectuses and filings. Sharing of common
facilities would then be "worked out by means of contractual arrange-
ments, easements, covenants and restrictions,"' 1 93 which may sound
much simpler than it probably is.'94 In some situations, developers may
prefer to keep a large part of the common areas out of the condo-
minium and hold title to these areas at least until completion of all
phases and then, perhaps, convey the common areas to the unit owners,
or in some cases where commercial facilities are involved, retain owner-
ship indefinitely.195 In some cases, title to the common facilities may be
held by a corporation, as discussed previously in this article. While the
corporate approach would help to avoid the expanding condominium
problem, it is probably not often employed because of the numerous
other problems involved.
This is clearly another area where statutory clarification would be
desirable. Steps in this direction are already being undertaken. Virginia,
for example, recently revised its condominium enabling legislation to
permit, under rather intricate statutory provisions, expansion, contrac-
tion, or conversion of condominium land. 96 Similar legislation in other
states would be most helpful.
192 See Outen, Condominiums That Can Grow, LAWYERS TITLE NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 1971.
at 11. Outen states that the declaration should contain I) a description of the land
submitted to the statute and the land which may be added to the project in order
to have definite and certain subject matter, id. at 11, 13; 2) the percentage interest in the
common areas, the voting rights of old and new owners and the number and description
of units that may be added, id. at 11, 14; 3) a specific time limitation on the developer's
option to expand the project (to avoid perpetuities problems), id. at 12; and 4) a lim-
itation on the developer's discretion as to the type and quality of future units, id. at 13.
Outen, who is Assistant General Counsel for Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, looks
at the problem from a conveyancing standpoint, and does not deal with condominium
legislation and regulations. Id. at 11. However, in conversations he has indicated that the
language of the New York type statute discussed above would not deter the title com-
pany in a typical "chinese menu" situation. Nevertheless, he indicated that his company
would hesitate to insure in New York because of objections raised by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office.
193Second Generation Condominium Problems, supra note 190, at 88.
194 Buck, supra note 189, at 13.
195 But see PLI TRANSCRIPT, supra note 32, at 358-59 (discussion by Professor Patrick
J. Rohan and Lewis R. Kaster on the possibilities of the New York Attorney General
approving a long-term lease to the unit owners of the facilities kept out of the condo-
minium).
196 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to 79.103 (Supp. 1974). The new provisions with respect




Every institution that decides to become a sponsor of a condo-
minium should realize that the possibilities of liability are far greater
than could ever be contemplated as a mortgagee. This section is pri-
marily a caveat to that effect.
Already discussed has been the possibility of liability for violation
of federal and state laws and regulations, including securities and blue
sky laws197 and a builder's liability in tort for negligent construction
of the condominium.198 A recent Florida case held that implied war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability extend to the purchase of new
condominiums from builders.19 9 This case points up the fact that the
doctrine of caveat emptor is taking quite a beating these days in con-
nection with new home construction200 and that contractual liability
may ensue from express warranties, implied warranties, and even, per-
haps from some rather standard provisions in a contract of sale.201
The point being made is that becoming a sponsor of a condo-
minium is not something that should be undertaken lightly. If trust is
placed in a developer-partner, it must be one in whom the institution
has justifiable confidence.
Capital Improvements on Conversion and Semi-Leasehold
Condominiums
While many condominiums are newly built, there may be a devel-
oping trend, at least in the housing area, toward condominium con-
versions.202 The institutional investor may receive offers from tenants
it is clear that the sponsor-declarant, provided he has followed the rules laid down,
may expand or contract the condominium without obtaining consent of the normally
required two-thirds of the unit owners, id. § 55-79.54(c)(2), (d)(2), it is not as dear that
he may then reallocate the unit interests without such consent. See id. §§ 55-79.71,
55-79.72(b), 55-79.72(e).
197 See text accompanying notes 141-84 supra.
198 See text accompanying notes 115-28 supra.
199 Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 264 So. 2d 418 (1972).
The court said that there was no express disclaimer of implied warranties here. Id. at
13-14. Had there been such a disclaimer, it is possible that the decision might have gone
the other way.
200 Said the court:
The general and still the majority rule is that implied warranties do not apply
to realty. . . . This general rule is fast being eroded. At last count, fourteen
states have adopted the modem rule, which extends implied warranties to
realty. . . . Only three states who have recently considered this problem have
declined to adopt the modern rule.
Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
201 See Annot., Liability of Builder-Vendor or Other Vendor of New Dwelling for
Loss, Injury, or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3d 383
(1969).
202 This trend received impetus when plans to condominiumize the north quadrant
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for the purchase of apartment houses, housing developments, and even
commercial buildings, as condominiums, or the institutional investor
might sponsor such conversions itself.2 0 3 The prospective purchasers,
however, may wish to make some capital improvements to the property,
such as rewiring or air conditioning of an entire building or develop-
ment. This section of the article will discuss the question of how pros-
pective unit owners can get financing for such improvements under the
present structure of the enabling legislation.
The condominium statutes generally severely restrict blanket mort-
gages on the condominium. For example, New York requires that all
blanket mortgages at the time of first conveyance of the units to the unit
owners must be satisfied of record;20 4 that banking organizations and
insurance companies, inter alia, may not make mortgage loans on con-
dominiums which are other than first mortgages or deeds of trust;2 0 5
and that liens of any nature are prohibited on the common elements
of Parkchester, see note 168 supra, were announced. According to Assistant Attorney
General David Clurman, this is probably the largest condominium conversion ever at-
tempted. "If this succeeds . .. New York City might start going into condominiums
in a big way." N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1972, at 49, col. 7. Harry Helmsley, who heads the
syndicate operating Parkchester, stated that a successful conversion of Parkchester would
produce "a revolution in New York real estate" in the next decade. Id. Whether or not
the conversion is successful, the attempt has already produced, or given impetus to,
restrictive legislation adopted in the 1974 session of the New York legislature. See N.Y.
SEss. LAWS [1974], ch. 1021, § 2 (McKinney), amending N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c (Mc-
Kinney 1968). This legislation presents serious difficulties to condominium conversions in
New York, at least until its July 1, 1976 expiration date. In New York City, where
Local Emergency Housing Rent Control ("emergency" from World War II) remains in ef-
fect for many apartments, tenants may not be evicted on conversion to condominiums or
co-ops unless 35% of the existing tenants have agreed to purchase. NEW YORK CITY,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § YY.51-.60(c)(9) (1971). Parkchester had been able to avoid obtaining
the required 35% resident approval for conversion of at least the first quadrant by
agreeing to permit all rent controlled tenants to remain in possession indefinitely. The
new law would prohibit the attorney general from approving any plan which does not
provide that consent of at least 35% of the tenants must be obtained before the plan
may be declared effective. N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 1021, § 2 (McKinney). In addition,
the new legislation declares, inter alia, that if the plan is not declared effective generally
within one year from filing, it is deemed abandoned and no new plan may be submitted
within 18 months from the date of abandonment; no eviction proceedings may be
brought against residents for two years, even if a lease has expired, unless the tenant
has failed to pay rent or the like; and there must not have been an "excess number of
long term vacancies" on the date of submission. Id.
203 When the institution is a mortgagee in a building that is being converted to a
condominium, it will be necessary to release the lien of the mortgage before the units
are sold. The mortgagee may be asked first to amend its mortgage from one describing
the entire property to one describing each unit and its common interest, and then to re-
lease each unit as it is sold. The mortgagee may also be asked to join in the declaration,
which may mean that if the condominium doesn't go through, the mortgagee on fore-
closure will own condominium units. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 189, at 335-36, for a
discussion of the construction mortgagee's position where the condominium is not con-
summated.
204 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-r (McKinney 1968).
205 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-ff(b) (McKinney 1968).
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"except with the unanimous consent of the unit owners. ' '206 While
New York seems to have one of the more restrictive statutes20 7 in this
connection, many other state enabling laws would effectively limit the
ability of the prospective unit owners to finance substantial capital im-
provements in a condominium.
On the other hand, there would seem to be a real need to protect
the unit owner against the dangers of blanket mortgages which can cut
off the estate of the unit owner for reasons other than acts or defaults of
his own. 208 Nevertheless, a legislative solution which would give reason-
able protection to the unit owner, but permit financing for needed im-
provements, would seem possible. With respect to capital improvements
needed at the time of conversion, it is suggested that the statute au-
thorize a limited blanket mortgage on the condominium for capital
improvements provided that the amount of the mortgage and a com-
plete description of the proposed capital improvements are contained
in the declaration. It would also be necessary in many states to amend
the legislation to provide that such mortgages may be subordinate to the
individual unit mortgages, 20 9 and that such subordinate mortgages
would be a legal investment for at least the institution that owned the
property prior to the condominiumization and sold it to the association.
This suggested amendment would not, of course, solve the problem
of financing capital improvements which become necessary after con-
dominiumization. This is a problem not only for conversions but for
every condominium. To facilitate such financing, the statute might be
amended to permit blanket mortgages upon a vote of say, 80 percent of
the unit owners with an overall limitation on the amount of such mort-
gages expressed in terms of actual dollars or a percentage of the cost or
assessed valuation of the condominium.
An alternative solution upon conversion might be for the institu-
tion to create a semi-leasehold condominium through the use of a sale-
206 Id. 339-1(1).
207 Many states, for ecample, do not specifically prohibit blanket mortgages and New
Jersey specifically authorizes blanket first mortgages in the following language: "[1]f the
master deed or by-laws so permit, the entire condominium property, or some or all of
the units included therein ... may be subject to a single or blanket mortgage constituting
a first lien thereon. ... NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-23 (Supp. 1973). See also MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.50(18) (Supp. 1973). Furthermore, other states do not limit financial institutions
to first liens "notwithstanding any other provision of law."
208 One of the advantages often cited for the condominium over the cooperative
from the unit owner's point of view is the absence of the large blanket mortgage which
makes the cooperative holder so dependent upon the solvency of others. See 4A R. POWELL,
THE LAW oF REAL PROPERTY § 633.10 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1972).
209 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-23 (Supp. 1973) (blanket mortgages authorized
provided they are first liens).
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leaseback of the land. Under this procedure, the land would be sold by
the purchasing association to the institution prior to conveyances of the
individual units, or where the institution is the vendor, the purchasing
association would buy only the buildings. The institution would lease
the land to the association and the association would convey to the pros-
pective unit owners a fee interest in their portion of the buildings and
assign to them a leasehold interest in the land.210 The purchase price
of the fee interest in the land (if the fee is sold to the institution) or
the value attributable to the land (if the association purchases only the
buildings) would be used to pay for the capital improvements, thus
increasing the value of the unit owners' interests so that the conveyance
of the fee should not reduce the possible mortgage available to the unit
owners.21 Such a mortgage would be a combination leasehold-fee mort-
gage. Probably, the individual unit mortgage would provide for a
"floor" loan of a lesser amount until the improvements are completed,
with payment of the additional sums upon such completion.
One difficulty with the use of the sale-leaseback technique is that
the unit owners would probably not be able to deduct the real estate
taxes on the land, title to which is in the institution.212 Another prob-
lem is that, at least in several states, leasehold condominiums may not
be legal. Many of the statutes do not mention leaseholds and some may
effectively prohibit them, expressly or impliedly.213 Except in the case
of nonresidential condominiums 214 most authorities conclude that lease-
hold condominiums would not be permitted in New York, relying on
210 Such a sale-leaseback after conversion would be difficult, because of the existence
of first unit mortgage liens on the units and the unit owner's undivided interest in the
common areas. Either the unit mortgages would have to be subordinated, or the insti-
tution would have to take title subject to the unit mortgages, an unlikely prospect.
211 As an additional protection to the unit owner, it has been suggested in con-
nection with the leasehold condominium that each unit owner's lease run directly between
the landowner and the unit owner so that there is no one blanket lease of the condo-
minium which would be subject to defeasance occasioned by acts or failures beyond
the control of the individual unit owner. See D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS
AND COOPERATIVES 151 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CLURMAN & HEBARD].
212 See note 59 supra; CLURMAN & HEBARD, supra note 211, at 148-49.
213 CLURMAN & HEBARD, supra note 211, at 147. Some of the possible abuses of the
leasehold condominium are set forth in Watch Out for Florida Condominiums!, DUN'S
June 1973, at 58, 61-62. See Florida's recent amendments regulating leasehold condomin-
iums, Ch. 74-104, § 16, [1974] Fla. Laws, adding FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.63 (Supp. 1974).
214 See N.Y. SEss. LAWS [1974], ch. 1056, § I (McKinney), which amends the definition
of "property" in N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(11) (McKinney 1968) to include "in the
case of a condominium devoted exclusively to non-residential purposes, [land, building
and other improvements] held under a lease or sublease, or separate unit lease or sub-
lease, the unexpired term or terms of which on the date of recording of the declaration
shall not be less than thirty years .. " The New Jersey Legislature has recently authorized
leasehold condominiums. See ch. 216, § 1, [1973] N.J. Acts 421, amending N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:8B-3(i) (Supp. 1973).
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the language of the New York enabling legislation which defines "unit
owner" as "the person or persons owning a unit in fee simple abso-
lute."21 5 Of course, what is being suggested here is not a pure leasehold
condominium, and it could be argued that under the semi-leasehold,
the New York requirement that the unit be owned in fee simple abso-
lute is met.2 16 It may be significant that the FHA Model Act defines
"apartment owner" (the Act's equivalent of "unit owner") as one own-
ing an apartment "in fee simple absolute and an undivided interest in
the fee simple estate of the common areas and facilities .... 217
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a more cautious approach in
those states where there is doubt about whether leasehold condo-
miniums are permitted, would be to attempt to separate out from the
condominium some of the common elements to which a measure of
value may be attributed, such as recreational facilities, swimming pools,
etc., and lease these to the condominium owners, leaving the condo-
minium itself owned in fee simple absolute. Even here, however, there
are problems, such as whether any resulting break in the contiguity of
condominium property is permitted; 218 whether rent payable under
property leased to the condominium is a common charge subject to
being enforced by the association's lien;219 and whether local regulatory
agencies will permit the long term lease.220 Also, as far as certain institu-
tions are concerned, state regulatory statutes may not permit ownership
of land used primarily for recreational purposes.221
The real solution to the problem of condominium improvements
215 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(15) (McKinney 1968). See CLURMAN & HEBARD, supra
note 211, at 147, where New York is listed among those states which expressly or implicitly
bar leasehold residential condominiums, and Fegan, supra note 83, at 271, where the
author states: "Leasehold condominiums are not permitted in New York and Illinois
and in many other states."
216 But see note 57 supra.
217 FHA Model Act supra note 12, § 2(b) (emphasis added).
218 See discussion of contiguity in Rohan, Problems in the Condominium Field, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 292, 298-304 (1969).
219 Some statutes limit the lien for common charges to expenses arising out of
common elements. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. Coow §§ 1355(b)(3), (4), (5), and (e) (Supp. 1972).
See also Krasnowiecki, supra note 89, at 360-61.
220 See PLI TRANSCRIPT, supra note 32, at 358-59 (discussion between Professor Patrick
J. Rohan and Lewis R. Kaster). See also Watch Out for Florida Condominiums!, DUN'S,
June 1973, at 61-62. Florida expressly permits the leasing of facilities to condominiums.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.24 (Supp. 1973). But see recently enacted § 711.63 regulating and
restricting the provisions of leases with terms in excess of five years. Ch. 74-104, § 16,
[1974] Fla. Laws.
221 See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 81(7)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1972), which was recently
amended, N.Y. SEss. LAws [1972], ch. 743, § 2 (McKinney), to delete the clause prohibiting
acquisition of real property for the production of income if such property was "to be
used primarily for agricultural, horticultural, ranch, mining, recreational, amusement
or club purposes .. "
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is statutory amendment, which as condominiums grow older, will be
needed more and more.
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AS CONDOMINIUM OWNER
We have come to what is perhaps the most speculative portion of
this article. Normally, one would not expect many institutional inves-
tors to be owners of condominium units except as a result of foreclosure
of mortgages. Yet many condominium enabling statutes are applicable
to commercial and industrial, as well as residential developments, and
one can foresee a dramatic increase in the use of the condominium for
industrial and commercial development in the future.222 This portion
of the article will discuss a few areas where the institutional investor
may find condominium ownership more advantageous than conven-
tional fee or leasehold ownership.
Company Offices
If an institution wishes to open an office not large enough to occupy
an entire high-rise office building, it will normally lease the space it
needs, with all of the lack of flexibility and freedom of use, and with
none of the possibility of appreciation associated with real estate owner-
ship. If the institution does not wish to lease space, it may construct its
own building and become landlord of the space it does not use or it
may construct a smaller building, probably not in the high-rent district,
for its own use.
While any of the above alternatives may be the most desirable ap-
proach for the institution to take depending on the particular facts and
circumstances, the advent of the commercial condominium affords the
institutional investor yet another alternative, under which it can have
the full advantage of real estate ownership, without owning more space
than it might foreseeably use, and do so in a high-rise building in the
commercial center of town. Other corporations have in growing num-
bers purchased condominium office space as shown by a recent survey
in The Condominium Report,223 which describes "innovative projects
222 Many states and the FHA Model Act use the term "apartment" instead of "unit."
In such states, unless the definition of "apartment" encompasses industrial and commercial
purposes, condominiums may be limited to residential buildings. For a discussion of this
problem, see I ROHAN & RESKIN § 5.01[2]. Nevertheless, "[iut is anticipated by many that
commercial condominium development will account for at least as much if not more
of the volume of condominium development than will residential condominium develop-
ment." Id. at 5.05. See generally D. CLURMAN, THE BusINESS CONDOMINmUMs (1973) [herein-
after cited as CLURMAN], for a thorough analysis of the structuring of this "new form of
business property ownership."
223 1 CONDOMINIUM REP., June 1973, at 5-8.
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[that] have begun to make their appearance in ever increasing num-
bers"2 24 covering multi-use, office building, industrial and shopping cen-
ter condominiums, and conversions of existing structures to commercial
condominium status. The list is impressive.
Condominiums vs. the Ground Lease
Where an owner of real estate wishes to retain title for any number
of reasons,225 and to lease for long term income, it is fairly clear that con-
dominiumization would not achieve these objectives except possibly
through a leasehold condominium. This is also true where the tenant
is not interested in owning real estate but would rather have a lease-
hold interest.226 In other areas, however, the condominium may be a
far more preferable alternative to the long-term ground lease.
One such area involves a situation such as that which existed when
the so-called "Park Avenue Properties" were developed. In 1913, New
York City, as an antipollution measure, required that the huge cut,
through which ran New York Central trains to and from Grand Central
Station, be covered.227 The railroad complied and built platforms over
the open railroad tracks. The next step was to arrange for the develop-
ment of these platforms with the construction of buildings along what
is now part of Park Avenue in New York City. The railroad needed the
subsurface for its tracks and equipment. The answer seemed to be to
lease out the platforms to people who would build buildings on them.
Unfortunately, however, the railroad's blanket mortgage did not permit
subordination to a leasehold. It did, however, permit the trustees to re-
lease from the lien of the mortgage such land as had been conveyed by
the railroad as a freehold estate.2 28 Thus was born the "grant of term"
under which the railroad conveyed an estate for a term of years to a
subsidiary corporation free of the mortgage. After the release, the mort-
gage encumbered the railroad's remainder interest only, and the sub-
sidiary was free to enter into ground leases with developers.
Today, the merged Penn Central Railroad is in reorganization, and
224 Id. at 5.
225 For example, long-term appreciation, and, where a building is involved, deprecia-
tion for tax purposes.
226 Some of the advantages of the sale-leaseback are discussed in Cary, Corporate
Financing Through the Sale and Leaseback of Property: Business, Tax and Policy Con-
siderations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1948), and Gunning & Roegge, Contemporary Real
Estate Financing Techniques: A Dialogue on Vanishing Simplicity, 3 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 325, 341-45 (1968).
227 See W. ZECKENDORF, ZECKENDORF 66 (1970).
228 Becker, Subdividing the Air-A New Method of Acquiring Air Rights, 6 Cm.-KENr
L. REv. Jan. 1927, at 6-7; Liebman, Development of Air Rights, 160 N.Y.L.J. 94, Nov. 13,
1968, at 1, col. 4.
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the trustees have indicated that they may seek a declaratory judgment
as to their right to disaffirm at least some of the leases.2 29 Institutional
investors are involved in the Park Avenue properties as both "ground"
and "sandwich" lessees and as leasehold mortgagees. While it would
seem that the conveyance of an estate for a term of years is no less a con-
veyance than a conveyance of a fee, and no more subject to disaffir-
mance,230 the specter of a disaffirmance has cast a pall over leasehold in-
vestment and leasehold mortgaging throughout the country.2 31
Had a condominium law been in effect when the Park Avenue
properties were created, the question faced today with respect to pos-
sible disaffirmance might possibly have been avoided. Under such legis-
lation, a condominium might have been established under which the
railroad owned the tracks, with the developer (or group of developers)
owning the property above the surface in one or more condominium
"units," with all parties having undivided interests in certain common
areas.
232
This would probably have met the release requirements of the rail-
road's blanket mortgage, but, of course, the railroad might not have
been willing to give up the prospect of the long-term net income. Never-
theless, it would seem that whenever the leasehold is employed and
one or more of the parties must have the use of a portion of the real
property, there is a possibility, absent business or other considerations
to the contrary, that the condominium may be a more preferable form
of ownership of interests in the real estate.
The question that follows is, of course, can the condominium be
employed in most of the long-term leasehold situations that have be-
come common, and thus eliminate the specter of disaffirmance? The
answer, unfortunately, is no under most of the situations as we now
know them. For example, in the usual sale-leaseback, where the owner
of the fee leases the entire land to a ground lessee, there may be no
method of establishing a condominimum because the real property is
not being divided. Rather, the title to the property is being divided into
229 The petition under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act was filed on June 21, 1970.
With respect to possible disaflirmance, see Report of Trustees on Executory Contracts 43-44
(Jan. 14, 1972), In re Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 21, 1970).
230 See generally Creedon & Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26
Bus. LAW. 1391, 1435 & n.161 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Creedon & Zinman].
231 Id. at 1435 n.161.
232 It is possible that a "condominium-like" conveyance of air space could have been
worked out without a condominium statute even then. See Becker, supra note 228, for a
discussion of such a conveyance where "the purchasers were distinctly pioneering in this
field." Id. at 10. See also Krasnowiecki, supra note 189, at 324.
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various types of estates- normally, a reversion and a leasehold, but
there may be many layers of leasehold interests. 233 Nevertheless, a con-
dominium may be used in some circumstances where the sale-leaseback
has previously been employed. The advantages of the "sale-condoback"
are discussed by New York Assistant Attorney General David Clurman
in his book The Business Condominium.234 Under this arrangement,
the owner will contract to sell his property on condition that part of
the same property is deeded back in condominium unit form. Thus "an
owner can retain a valuable portion of real estate as an owner while
cashing in on a substantial selling price for the rest of the property. ' '235
Other Possibilities
Notwithstanding the apparent limitations on the use of the con-
dominium in some of the conventional ground lease situations, there are
other possibilities for the use of condominiums, sometimes along with
ground leases. For example, a group can acquire a parcel or parcels of
property236 with a view to condominiumization, and each may operate
their portion of the real estate, or ground lease it to a sandwich or
operating lessee. In this way, it is possible to conceive of the future
development of vast acreages of commercial as well as residential con-
dominiums, with each developer owning his portion, but with the entire
condominium operated by an association, with tenants of the condo-
minium owners entitled to use facilities common to the "unit" owners.
The possibilities may be endless. There is no doubt that condo-
minium ownership offers a flexibility to the development and use of
land undreamed of not many years ago. In such development, there
unquestionably will be an active and important place for the institu-
tional investor.
CONCLUSION
The phenomenal condominium boom has been heard throughout
the land. An institutional investor cannot help but become involved,
certainly as mortgagee, possibly as sponsor, and, under some circum-
stances, perhaps as owner. This article has looked again at the condo-
minium picture, eleven years after William Kerr's .preview, in an
233 In many of our large cities, the ground lease has been used to divide a fee
estate and the investment therein among several participants. Office buildings are often
structured in layers of ground leases, sandwich leases and operating leases. For an example
of such layering, see Creedon & Zinman, supra note 230, at 1391 n.3.
234 CLURmAN, supra note 222, ch. IV.
235 Id. at 55
236 This may be a fee interest, or where permitted by the applicable condominium
enabling legislation, a leasehold interest.
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attempt to highlight some of the current problems faced by, and op-
portunities available to, life insurance companies and other institutions
in condominium investment.
Certainly all the problems have not been explored and, due to
limitations of space and scope, many of those that have been covered
have been touched on only lightly. In addition, as institutional in-
volvement in condominium investment increases, many new and
difficult problems, as well as many new and fascinating opportunities,
unknown today, will undoubtedly appear. So perhaps "conclusion" is
the wrong title for this section of the article. The condominium
journey from the legal as well as business standpoint may be just
beginning in this country. And as we move into these uncharted waters,
we see the horizon constantly receding before us. Nevertheless, although
conclusions may be difficult to reach, a few sailing directions can be
gathered from this article.
1. There is much need for a comprehensive revision of condo-
minium enabling legislation on a national and uniform basis. If a
uniform condominum statute were to be drafted and adopted in the
several states, it could clarify and eliminate many of the problems faced
today by the condominium mortgagee, sponsor, and unit owner. Fortu-
nately, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws' Special Committee on Uniform Land Transactions Code has
begun to consider the drafting of such a uniform condominium act as
Article VII of its proposed Code. It is important that the statute not
be simply the lowest common denominator of existing condominium
legislation. If the drafters will deal directly with the current problems
such as limiting tort liability, providing for a comprehensive, sensible
insurance program, and facilitating the development of the expanding
condominium and the financing of capital improvements, to mention
only a few, the uniform act can constitute a significant contribution
to the economic development of the nation and the standard of life of
its inhabitants.
2. Until clarifying legislation is enacted, life insurance companies
and other institutions must guard against becoming so caught up in the
condominium explosion that the problems and risks are ignored. With
proper caution, careful study of the transactions, and close control over
decisions which can affect profits, return and liability, there is no doubt
that a great role may be played by the institutional lenders in con-
dominium investment and development.
